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I. INTRODUCTION*
The Virginia Constitution mandates that all property within the state,
except exempt property, must be taxed.' In light of the constitution's
directive, this note examines the present Virginia property taxation struc-
ture in order to provide the practitioner with a guide to its application and
operation.
Such a discussion necessarily involves an analysis of the constitutional
parameters of uniformity of taxation, assessment at fair market value and
the specific exemptions provisions. Proceeding from these constitutional
foundations, the note concentrates on the application of the Virginia tax
structure to real property, tangible personal property and intangible
personal property, distinguishing the variations in the taxation of each. In
addition, statutory provisions for special land use assessments and the
procedures employed to remedy erroneous assessments are considered.
Realizing the existence of ambiguities and inconsistencies within the
Virginia property taxation system, and the confusion resulting therefrom,
this note endeavors to identify the types of property taxable in Virginia and
outline the procedures involved in that taxation.
* The student contributors are Gordon M. Cooley, Burton F. Dodd, Norman T. Fowlkes,
Julia Krebs-Markrich and Ronald E. Kuykendall.
1. VA. CONST. art X, § 1.
PROPERTY TAXATION
II. SEGREGATION, CLASSIFICATION AND UNIFORMITY
The power of property taxation is inherently enjoyed by the Virginia
General Assembly.' Since in its pristine form this legislative prerogative
is unlimited, 2 both the Constitution of the United States3 and the Virginia
Constitution impose restrictions on its exercise. Article X, section 1 of the
Virginia Constitution5 is one such restriction,' embracing within its several
significant limitations7 on the state's exercise of the taxing power.
Specifically, section 1 encompasses the requirement that all property
must be equally and uniformly taxed. This section also establishes the
power of the General Assembly to segregate subjects of property for either
state or local taxation and to classify subjects of property for taxation at
either level. In the following discussion, to the extent possible, each provi-
sion of section 1 will be examined independently. It must be kept in mind,
however, that in many situations these provisions are interrelated.
1. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931). "The power of taxation is
fundamental to the very existence of the government of the States." Id. at 537, quoted in
Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 220, 176 S.E.2d 578, 584 (1970). The power of
the Commonwealth of Virginia to impose taxes is inherent, arising independently of the
Constitution of the United States. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 517,
145 S.E.2d 227 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 268 (1966); City of Richmond v. Common-
wealth, 188 Va. 600, 50 S.E.2d 654 (1948); 11 A. HowARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION
OF VIRGINIA 1036 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HowARD].
2. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 517, 145 S.E.2d 227 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 384 U.S. 268 (1966). The state's power of taxation is unlimited unless restrained
by the state or federal constitutions. Id. at 523, 145 S.E.2d at 232.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The equal protection clause is the most significant restriction
imposed on the exercise of the state's power of property taxation by the Constitution of the
United States. It is especially important in relation to the state's power to classify property
for taxation. See notes 43-46 infra.
4. VA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1-11.
5. Present article X, § 1 was derived from §§ 168 and 169 of the 1902 constitution. The
only substantial difference between § 1 and §§ 168 and 169 concerns uniformity of taxation
after annexation, discussed in section II D(1) infra. Therefore, for purposes of this section,
the uniformity provisions of §§ 168 and 169 and § 1 are identical.
6. City of Norfolk v. Chamberlain, 89 Va. 196, 16 S.E. 730 (1892). In discussing, inter alia,
the uniformity limitations of the 1870 constitution, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that
such provisions are mandatory, imposing "specific limitations and restrictions upon the tax-
ing power, and they must be observed and obeyed by the legislative department of the
government, unless that department, the mere creature of the Constitution, has ... been
invested with authority paramount to that of the Constitution itself . Id. at 204, 16
S.E. at 732.
7. The limitations are significant in the sense that adherence to them is necessary for the
imposition of a constitutionally valid tax, not in the sense that they form an insurmountable
barrier to the creation of a flexible tax structure.
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A. SEGREGATION
The General Assembly's power of property segregation enables it to
classify taxable subjects for taxation at either the state or local level.'
However, another section of the constitution"0 restricts that power by con-
stitutionally segregating certain classes of property for local taxation
only," thereby prohibiting the state from taxing those classes.2 Limited
only therefore by the constitution's preclusion of state taxation upon the
property enumerated in section 4, the General Assembly is free to segregate
all other classes of taxable property. 3
Because the segregation provisions of the constitutioi are not self-
effectuating,'4 legislative action was necessary to implement them.'5 Thus
in sections 58-9's and 58-10'1 of the Code, the General Assembly codified
the constitutional provision for segregation of certain classes of property
to the localities for taxation'8 and exercised its own power of segregation.
Specifically, section 58-9 of the Code segregates to the localities for taxa-
tion the classes of property found in section 4, including all taxable real
8. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
9. Segregation has the effect of allocating certain sources of tax revenue to either the state
or to the localities. Holt, Constitutional Revision in Virginia, 1902 and 1928: Some Lessons
on Roadblocks to Institutional Reform, 54 VA. L. Rav. 903 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Holt].
10. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
VA. CONST. §§ 171, 172 (1928) are the progenitors of present section 4. Section 4 does not
differ significantly from these prior provisions. Constitutional segregation was proposed and
ratified as a solution to state-wide assessment inequities. See generally Holt, supra note 9,
at 920-21.
11. Section 4 does not impliedly segregate any subject of property for state taxation alone.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Newport News, 196 Va. 627, 85 S.E.2d 345 (1955);
Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 58 S.E.2d 316 (1950). Section 1 does,
however, provide the mechanism by which the General Assembly may segregate property,
not segregated constitutionally, through legislation. See notes 32-41 infra and accompanying
text.
12. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Newport News, 196 Va. 627, 85 S.E.2d 345
(1955); Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 58 S.E.2d 316 (1950); 1976 Op.
VA. ATr'v GEN. 371.
13. Section 4 does reserve to the General Assembly the power to prescribe in what manner
and at what time the subjects of property segregated to the localities shall be assessed for
local taxation. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-847 to -851.8 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum.
Supp. 1976). See notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text.
14. County of Prince William v. Thomason Park, Inc., 197 Va. 861, 91 S.E.2d 441 (1956).
15. Id.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-9 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
17. Id. § 58-10.
18. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
19. See VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
[Vol. 11:589
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estate, 0 coal and other mineral lands2' and tangible personal property, 2
except the rolling stock of public service corporations.2 3 In addition, pur-
suant to its power of segregation,2 4 the General Assembly has segregated
merchant's capital 25 solely for local taxation under Code section 58-9,
thereby precluding state taxation of merchant's capital.
Although forbidden from taxing the locally segregated property, the
General Assembly has not been divested of all power or control over this
property. The constitution expressly gives to the legislature the right to
prescribe the time and manner of assessment of the locally segregated
property. Pursuant to article X, section 4, the legislature has statutorily
delineated,21 inter alia, the power of localities to collect taxes in install-
ments,28 the power to set penalties for failure to comply with local tax
ordinances, 2 the local officials' power to distrain 0 and the power to impose
different rates upon the classes of property segregated for local taxation by
20. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-758 to -828 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
21. See id. §§ 58-774 to -774.2. See generally 1976 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 370-72.
22. See id. §§ 58-829 to -838. Although tangible personal property and real estate are both
segregated for local taxation, it occasionally becomes necessary, due to different tax rates and
modes of assessment between personalty and realty, to determine whether personalty has.
become realty by virtue of annexation. A threefold test is employed in which (1) the property's
annexation and (2) its adaptation are (3) examined in light of the annexor's intention toward
the property. Each case turns on its own particular fact situation. Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp. v. County of Prince William, 210 Va. 550, 172 S.E.2d 257 (1970); 1972 Op. VA.
ATr'Y GEN. 412.
23. Section 4's exception of rolling stock from solely local taxation does not by implication
make it taxable exclusively by the state. The rolling stock of public service corporations is
not the subject of any constitutional segregation. East Coast Freight Lines v. City of Rich-
mond, 194 Va. 517, 74 S.E.2d 283 (1953).
24. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
25. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-830, -832, -833, -833.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum.
Supp. 1976). Merchant's capital is intangible personal property and thus a tax levied thereon
is a property tax. City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 90 S.E. 635 (1916).
Although intangible personal property is segregated for state taxation under § 58-10, the
General Assembly has exercised its § 1 power of property classification and segregation to
segregate merchant's capital, as a separate class of intangible personal property, for local
taxation. City of Roanoke v. James W. Michael's Bakery Corp., 180 Va. 132, 21 S.E.2d 788
(1942); 1975 Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 474.
Other than as defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 58-833 (Repl. Vol. 1974), or unless exempt from
taxation, all other forms of the capital of merchants are deemed as intangible personal
property and, therefore, are segregated to the state for taxation. Id. § 58-410.
26. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 4.
27. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-847 to -851.8 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
28. Id. § 58-847 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 58-850 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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the constitution.3 ' The state has therefore retained procedural control of
the local taxing power, notwithstanding the denial of the power to tax.
Unlike Code section 58-9, 31 the classes of property in Code section 59-10
are segregated for state taxation exclusively under the General Assembly's
constitutional power of segregation.n The classes made amenable to state
taxation alone under section 58-10 are insurance taxes," licenses on insur-
ance companies,3 5 intangible personal property," the rolling stock of all
corporations operating railroads by steam and all other classes of property
not specifically segregated for local taxation under Code section 58-9. And
again, merchant's capital is segregated to the localities for taxation.'
The segregation to the state of all other classes of property not previously
segregated in Code section 58-9 limits the property taxing power of locali-
ties to the classes of property enumerated within section 58-9. However,
since Code section 58-10's segregation of "all other classes of property'19 is
not synonymous with allocating "all other subjects of taxation"45 to the
31. Id. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
32. With the exception of merchant's capital, all of the classes of property enumerated in
§ 58-9 are constitutionally mandated for local taxation.
33. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
34. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-486 to -502.10 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
35. See id.
36. See id. 44 58-405 to -441.52 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
37. See id. 44 58-515 to -539.
38. The provisions for merchant's capital in § 58-9 ("The capital of merchants . . . [is]
... subject to local taxation only.") (emphasis added) and § 58-10 ("The capital of mer-
chants . .. may be taxed . . .") (emphasis added) are not inconsistent. In light of article
X, § 1 of the constitution which requires that all property be taxed unless exempt, the
provision for merchant's capital in § 58-10 evinces no legislative attempt to delegate to
localities the power to exempt merchant's capital from taxation. Rather, § 58-10 provides
localities with the choice of either taxing merchant's capital under § 58-9 or imposing a license
tax on merchants in lieu thereof, under VA. CODE ANN. § 58-266.1(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976). 1975
OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 474-75.
Localities also have the power to lower the tax rate on merchant's capital relative to the
rates on tangible personal property and real estate if the tax on merchants is too burdensome.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976); 1971 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 420.
39. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Newport News, 196 Va. 627, 635, 85 S.E.2d
345, 349 (1955); Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 583, 58 S.E.2d 316, 325
(1950).
40. Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 584, 58 S.E.2d 316, 325 (1950). The
appellants, complaining of a local nonproperty tax, contended that the effect of §§ 58-9 and
58-10 was to allocate to the localities for taxation only those subjects of property found in §
58-9, and that § 58-10 allocated all other subjects of taxation to the state. The Supreme Court
disagreed and, in holding that subjects of taxation was a broader term than classes of
property, concluded that the operation of §§ 58-9 and 58-10 did not preclude localities from
levying nonproperty taxes since only property, just one subject of taxation, had been classified
and segregated between the state and the localities.
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state, localities are not denied the power to levy excise, license, privilege
or other forms of nonproperty taxes."
Thus, Code sections 58-9 and 58-10 delineate upon what classes of prop-
erty local and state taxes shall be levied; they do not preclude the imposi-
tion of taxes by either level of government on other subjects of taxation.
Segregation is not, however, the sole power conferred on the General
Assembly by article X, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution. The power
of property classification is similarly delegated and indeed operates con-
comitantly 2 with the power of segregation.
B. CLASSIFICATION
Article X, section 1 specifically gives the General Assembly the power
to classify property for taxation at either the state or local level.4 3 The
exercise of this power, however, is limited by the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment." But since the requirement of equal protec-
tion demands only that a classification be "reasonable, "4 5 the United
States Constitution does not significantly inhibit the General Assembly's
power of property classification. 6 As employed in the Virginia tax struc-
41. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. City of Newport News, 196 Va. 627, 85 S.E.2d 345
(1955); Fallon Florist, Inc. v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 58 S.E.2d 316 (1950); 1976 Op..
VA. A'r'Y GEN. 571-72.
42. Sections 58-9 and 58-10 dictate what body of government taxes the particular classes
of property found in each statute. The power of classification determines into which class a
particular item of property will be placed-hence how that item will be taxed.
43. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 1. The power of the state to classify subjects of property for
taxation.is not questioned. City of Richmond v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 50 S.E.2d 654
(1948); Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941). See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Com-
monwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); Town of Ashland v. Board of Supv'rs, 202
Va. 409, 117 S.E.2d 679 (1961); East Coast Freight Lines v. City of Richmond, 194 Va. 517,
74 S.E.2d 283 (1953); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 688, 194 S.E.
775 (1938).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
"The States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522, 526 (1959).
45. Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jack-
son, 283 U.S. 527 (1931). "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the
State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation." Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232,
237 (1890); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); Washington
County Nat'l Bank v. Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515 (1940).
In City of Richmond v. Fary, 210 Va. 338, 171 S.E.2d 257 (1969), the supreme court noted
that three requirements are necessary to sustain a classification against allegations that it
violated the equal protection clause. A classification must (1) rest on "real and not feigned
differences," (2) have "relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made" and (3)
not be "wholly arbitrary." Id. at 344, 171 S.E.2d at 262.
46. HowARD, supra note 1, at 1044-45. However, when a classification is patently arbitrary,
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ture, classification "is a word of art with special import, connoting a divi-
sion into separate classes."47 It is not used in the definitional sense."
The significance of the power to classify is revealed by the flexible tax
structure which results when items of taxable property are classified. This
flexibility occurs because the equal tax treatment mandated by the consti-
tution49 is required only among the several members of a class, not among
the several classes. '0 Thus, when the General Assembly classified tangible
personal property, "' the tax treatment accorded that class could vary from
that accorded another class without violating the constitutional directive.5 2
The General Assembly has selectively exercised the power of classifica-
tion upon items of property, including, but not limited to, tangible per-
sonal property.53 The legislative purpose in classifying such property has
varied from authorizing lower rates of taxation 4 or exemptions from taxa-
tion for certain subclassifications of property within a given classification55
to providing tax incentives for special uses of land. 6 In short, the rationale
behind the exercise of the classification power reflects the need in the
administration of the tax system for the continuing ability to adapt to
changing circumstances.
capricious and does not rest on any substantial basis, it cannot be upheld in light of the
fourteenth amendment. Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287 (1941).
47. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113, 115 (1976). In this
case, the Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that VA. CODE ANN. § 58-829
(Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976) was merely "an inventory or grouping of
taxable subjects within a single class." 217 Va. at 204, 228 S.E.2d at 115.
48. 217 Va. at 204, 228 S.E.2d at 115.
49. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
50. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976); City of
Richmond v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 50 S.E.2d 654 (1948); 1973 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN.
410.
51. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-829 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
52. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
53. Tangible personal property is classified in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-829 to -829.3 (Repl.
Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also id. § 58-16.3 (Repl. Vol. 1974)(pollution
control devices and facilities, whether realty or personalty).
Real estate, with the exception of land devoted to special uses [see id. 58-769.4 to -769.16
(Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976)], has not been further classified to allow
for varying tax treatment. Therefore, the tax treatment accorded real estate must be equal
upon all such property within the confines of the taxing jurisdiction. 1972 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN.
422.
54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
55. See id. § 58-829.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974)(optional exemption of household goods); id. § 58-
829.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 1976)(optional exemption of farming necessities).
56. See id. §§ 58-769.4 to -769.16 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976). See
the discussion of these sections in section IV(C) infra.
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The various classification provisions for locally segregated tangible per-
sonal property 7 allow for especially diverse tax treatment at the local level.
Since equal tax treatment is required only within a particular classification
(subclassification or otherwise)58 and only within the territorial limits of
the taxing jurisdiction, 9 each local authority has the power to adjust its
local tax structure to reflect its fiscal needs."0 The power of classification
is thus an integral element in the Virginia scheme of taxation, providing
flexibility by allowing taxing authorities to take cognizance of current
needs and demands and by providing the mechanism whereby future needs
and demands can be met. But, however easily the equal protection require-
ment' on the exercise of the power of classification is satisfied,"2 the tax
treatment accorded the various members of a class is subject to a further
limitation found in article X, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution. This
is the requirement of uniformity.
57. Id. § 58-820 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976). See, e.g., id. § 58-829.1
(Repl. Vol. 1974); id. § 58-829.9:1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); id. § 58-851.
In addition to tangible personal property, real estate and merchants' capital are locally
segregated. Real estate, like tangible personal property, has been further classified. See id.
§ 58-16.3 (Repl. Vol. 1974) (pollution control devices); id. §§ 58-769.4 to -769.16 (Repl. Vol.
1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976) (land devoted to special uses); § 58-512.1 (Cum. Supp.
1976) (unequalized public service corporation real estate). Merchants' capital has not been
further classified. Section 58-851 allows localities to impose different tax rates upon realty,
merchants' capital and tangible personal property, or to impose the same rate upon two or
all three of these classes. However, § 58-851 must now be read in light of R. Cross, Inc. v.
City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976), wherein the supreme court held
that § 58-829 was classific, thereby allowing differing tax treatment for the various classes of
tangible personal property enumerated therein. The conclusion seems inescapable that the
decision in Cross incorporated § 58-829's classification of tangible personal property into the
provision for similar property in § 58-851. Construed in this fashion, § 58-851 allows for
differing or identical tax rates by a locality on real estate, merchants' capital, tangible
personal property, and, due to the Cross decision, on the various classes of tangible personal
property enumerated in § 58-829. Moreover, § 58-851 would now seem to allow differing rates
on subclassifications of real estate or merchant's capital that exist now or may exist in the
future.
58. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976). The
taxpayer will not be heard to complain of unequal tax treatment between classes, since
"[tihe Constitution does not require uniformity among separate tax classes." Id. at 206, 228
S.E.2d at 116.
VA. CODE ANN. 83 58-829 to -829.3 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Stdpp. 1976),
divides all tangible personal property into numerous subclasses. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of
Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
59. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
60. Many of the classification sections providing for differing tax treatment within classes
are optional for the locales. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 44-46 supra and cases cited therein.
62. Cf. Williams v. City of Richmond, 177 Va. 477, 14 S.E.2d 287 (1941). See note 46 supra.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
C. UNIFORMITY
The equality and uniformity rule mandated by the Virginia Constitu-
tion 3 requires uniform tax treatment within each class of property" within
each particular taxing jurisdiction, so as to ratably apportion the tax bur-
dens of government. " Uniform tax treatment is, however, a generic phrase
encompassing several distinct requirements. First, uniformity requires
that the rate of tax be the same upon all property within a class." Second,
the mode of assessment of the taxable property within a given class must
be uniform. " And third, the uniformity must be coextensive with the geo-
graphic area of the taxing authority."' A tax adhering to these basic propo-
sitions cannot be successfully challenged as violating the uniformity re-
quirement.
Challenges to taxing schemes alleging a lack of uniformity in the mode
of assessment have been by far the most frequently litigated aspect of the
uniformity requirement. In the typical situation the requirement of uni-
63. VA. CONST. art. X, §1.
64. Id. The rule of uniformity applies only to a direct tax on property. See, e.g., Town of
Ashland v. Board of Supv'rs, 202 Va. 409, 117 S.E.2d 679 (1961); Commonwealth v. Whiting
Oil Co., 167 Va. 73, 187 S.E. 498 (1936).
65. Equality, as employed in § 1, concerns the equitable distribution of the tax burden
among the taxpayers subject to the tax. Equal taxation therefore "apportion[s] the contri-
bution of each person towards the expense of government so that he shall feel neither more
nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment than every other person experiences."
City of Hampton v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 177 Va. 494, 499, 14 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1941),
quoting Adams v. Mississippi State Bank, 75 Miss. 701, 23 So. 395, 397 (1898). See, e.g.,
Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 437 (1947); Washington
County Nat'l Bank v. Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515 (1940).
66. Day v. Roberts, 101 Va. 248, 43 S.E. 362 (1903). See, e.g., Moss v. County of Tazewell,
112 Va. 878, 72 S.E. 945 (1911).
67. Day v. Roberts, 101 Va. 248, 43 S.E. 362 (1903). See, e.g., R. Cross, Inc. v. City of
Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211
Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578
(1970).
Mode of assessment should not be confused with the procedures employed to determine
the value of property. Uniformity in the mode of assessment requires a just valuation of
property. So long as a just valuation is achieved, the use of various procedures or methods to
arrive at that valuation is not precluded. If, however, a just valuation is not reached and
uniformity is violated, the methods used in the valuation process may themselves be the
cause of the violation. See R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d
113, n.2, 117 n.6 (1976). See notes 79-82 infra and accompanying text.
68. Day v. Roberts, 101 Va. 248, 43 S.E. 362 (1903). See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210,
176 S.E.2d 578 (1970).
69. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); Tucka-
hoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958); Skyline Swanna-
noa, Inc. v. Nelson County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 437 (1947).
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formity is incompatable with the constitutional mandate of assessment at
"fair market value."' 0 When such is the case, the courts are agreed that
uniformity is the end to be desired." This conflict no longer exists in
relation to real estate since after January 1, 1977, all assessments are to
be at 100% of fair market value,72 as the constitution has long required.73
However, in relation to tangible personal property, the conflict still exists,
and the courts will still insist upon uniformity as the end to be attained. 4
But the new requirement of 100% assessment for realty notwithstanding,
still lingering is the difficulty in actually determining what is the fair
market value of the property.75 A lack of uniformity can exist if it is shown
that the assessed fair market value exceeds the actual fair market value.7 6
"Mode of assessment" is, however, a broad phrase, encompassing more
than just the determination of the property's value. Thus, the piecemeal
reassessment of similarly situated real estate over a period of time will
70. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2. See discussion of this requirement in section III infra.
In Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669 (1926),
appellant's real estate was assessed at 100% of fair market value, while other real estate
within the taxing jurisdiction was assessed at 50% of fair market value. Uniformity was
violated because of nonuniform modes of assessment, but to lower appellant's assessed value
to 50% to satisfy uniformity would violate the requirement of 100% fair market value assess-
ments [art. X, § 2]. The Supreme Court of Virginia lowered the assessed value to conform
with the uniformity mandate. See R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202,
228 S.E.2d 113 (1976); Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d
437 (1947).
71. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); R. Cross, Inc. v. City of
Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
The two sections [§ 1 (uniformity), § 2 (assessment at fair market value)] must
be construed together. The dominant purpose of these provisions is to distribute the
burden of taxation, so far as is practical, evenly and equitably. If it is impractical or
impossible to enforce both the standard of true value and the standard of uniformity
and equality, the latter provision is to be preferred as the just and ultimate end to be
attained. [citations omitted].
217 Va. at 207, 228 S.E.2d at 117, quoting Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County, 186
Va. 878, 881, 44 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1947).
72. VA. CODE ANr. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
73. The 100% fair market value assessment requirement of article X, § 2, has long been
circumvented by allowing assessments at a percentage of fair market value. See, e.g., R.
Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976); Tuckahoe Woman's
Club v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958). See discussion in section I
infra.
74. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976). See note
71 supra.
75. It is much more difficult to ascertain the true value of real estate than the traditional
"willing buyer-willing seller" concept would seem to indicate. See section III A infra for a
compilation of the evidence considered when trying to determine the fair market value of
property.
76. See Smith v. City of Covington, 205 Va. 104, 135 S.E.2d 220 (1964).
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create unequal tax burdens in derogation of uniformity." But the selective
reassessment of parcels of similarly situated real estate when their value
has changed dramatically in relation to the other property will be upheld
as promoting uniformity."' A uniform mode of assessment is, therefore, any
procedure whereby a "just valuation ' 79 of the property in question is
achieved. For real estate this "just valuation" is 100% of its fair market
value; 0 for tangible personal property it is a fixed percentage of appraised
value."' Thus, if the tax rate is uniform, the principles required by the
constitution, that is, uniformity and assessment at fair market value, are
satisfied.1
2
Uniformity in the mode of assessment and in the tax rate is only required
within the territorial limits of the taxing authority.83 Generally, the terri-
torial limits of the taxing authority correspond with the area lawfully pre-
scribed to enjoy the benefits of the tax. 4 Therefore, if a county levies a
property tax, any towns located therein are subject to the tax if the benefits
from that tax will be enjoyed by the whole county.8 5 The same applies to
district taxes levied within the various magisterial districts."8 But there is
no violation of uniformity if, for example, the tax rate on a class of property
located in one county is greater than that on the same property located in
77. Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 240, 198 S.E.2d 626, modified and aff'd on
rehearing, 214 Va. 416, 200 S.E.2d 566 (1973).
78. Id. 1974 OP. VA. Afr'y GEN. 394-95; 1973-1974 Annual Survey of Developments in
Virginia Law-Taxation, 60 VA. L. REV. 1607 (1974).
79. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 207, 228 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1976),
quoting Iverson Brown's Case, 91 Va. 762, 767, 21 S.E. 357, 358-59 (1895).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Prior to 1977, real estate was commonly
assessed at a certain percentage of fair market value, depending on the particular locality's
practice. See note 73 supra and cases cited therein.
81. Since uniformity is required only within the territorial limits of the taxing authority,
each locality is free to assess tangible personal property by any method which produces a just
valuation. E.g., R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
82. Id.
83. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692,
179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970).
84. Watkins v. Barrow, 121 Va. 236, 92 S.E. 908 (1917). The territorial limits of the taxing
authority are the actual boundaries of each political subdivision, be it the state, a county or
a magisterial district. Id. See 1975 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 498.
85. Campbell v. Bryant, 104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638 (1905). In Woolfolk v. Driver, 186 Va.
174, 41 S.E.2d 463 (1947), the exemption of the town of Bowling Green from county levies by
the Act of Assembly incorporating the town was held to violate the uniformity requirement.
1972 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 96; 1971 OP. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 386.
86. Watkins v. Barrow, 121 Va. 236, 92 S.E. 908 (1917); 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 389 (to
avoid violating uniformity, a tax levied within a magisterial district must be for a purpose
particular to that district, such as school or road taxes); 1972 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN. 96 (a town
is a special district for school taxes).
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another or adjacent county."7 Taxes are required to be uniform only within
each taxing jurisdiction. However, since uniformity applies only to a direct
tax on property,'- statutes allowing municipalities to levy nonproperty
taxes applicable only within their limits do not violate the requirement.89
Such statutes also exempt the municipalities from nonproperty county
levies. 0
The requirement of uniformity, although a significant and necessary"
limitation on the state's taxing power, is not as formidable as it sometimes
appears. First, it is applicable only within each taxing jurisdiction, 2 and
secondly, it is required only among the members of a particular class of
property, not between classes. 3 In several instances, the further subclassi-
fication of property by the legislature has reduced uniformity's applicabil-
ity even within classes. 4 Thus, the flexibility of the tax structure occa-
sioned by the General Assembly's exercise of its segregation and classifica-
tion powers is not seriously restricted by the mandate of uniformity, nor
by the requirements of the equal protection clause. 5
D. ALL PROPERTY MUST BE TAXED
1. Introduction
The Virginia Constitution requires that all property must be taxed and
taxed uniformly. 6 The constitution also provides for exceptions from that
mandate in article X, sections 1 and 6. Article X, section 111 is not an
exemption from taxation, but a provision which allows a town or city
bringing property within its borders8 to impose a lower tax rate on the real
87. Tresnon v. Board of Supv'rs, 120 Va. 203, 90 S.E. 615 (1916).
88. E.g., Town of Ashland v. Board of Supv'rs, 202 Va. 409, 117 S.E.2d 679 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Whiting Oil Co., 167 Va. 73, 187 S.E. 498 (1936).
89. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-587.1, -617.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
90. Id.
91. The requirement of uniformity is significant in that it insures an equal tax burden upon
all affected by tax levies, and it is necessary in order to stay within the confines of equal
protection.
92. See notes 83-84 supra.
93. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. See R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228
S.E.2d 113 (1976).
94. See notes 53-59 supra.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See notes 44-46 supra.
96. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
97. See the discussion of this section in Roanoke v. Hill, 193 Va. 643, 70 S.E.2d 270 (1953);
1970-1971 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-Taxation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1618, 1624,
1625 (1971).
98. The provision applies not only to annexed territory but also to the consolidation of
cities or areas. See 18 MICHm's JuR. Taxation § 13 n.19 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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estate located in the new territory than on the real estate located in the
original territory of the city or town. A lower tax rate is permitted, however,
only if it bears "a reasonable relationship" to the difference in the level of
services furnished the two areas." The General Assembly in its enabling
legislation limited the duration of this tax reduction to five years from the
date of consolidation.'
All other exemptions from the requirement that all property be taxed
and taxed uniformly are found in article X, section 6. Paragraphs (a), (c)
and (f) of section 6 provide the basic boundaries within which this section
must be construed. Section 6(a) provides that the only property exempt
from taxation is that delineated within that section, and section 6(c) pro-
vides that the General Assembly can restrict but not extend the listed
exemptions. These provisions have been construed as preventing the Gen-
eral Assembly or any political subdivision of the Commonwealth from
exempting property other than that afforded constitutional protection.'
They have also been construed as preventing a local government from
contracting away its right to tax02 or contracting for the payment of taxes
in advance. 1 3
Section 6(f) provides for the strict construction of section 6 exemptions.
This provision is the constitutional incorporation of a generally accepted
principle that taxes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer and exemp-
tions are to be construed against the taxpayer."'4 It is also in accord with
the statement found in Rivercomb v. Dillard"' which requires that the
taxpayer bear the burden of showing that his property falls within an
exemption. This strict construction requirement is tempered, however, by
two other provisions of article X, section 6. The first establishes a
"grandfather clause.""' It states, "all property exempted from taxation on
99. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. Services mean city water, light, fire protection, police protec-
tion, schools or street lights. HOWARD, supra note 1, at 1045.
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1047.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
101. Hollywood Cemetery Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 106, 96 S.E. 207 (1918); 1973 OP.
VA. Arr'y GEN. 409.
102. City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, 149 S.E. 632 (1929); City of
Richmond v. Virginia Ry. & Power Co., 124 Va. 529, 98 S.E. 691 (1919).
Contracts in which a party provides service to a governmental entity for the price of their
property taxes are not considered as violating this rule provided the compensation (no taxes)
is reasonable in relation to the services provided. 153 Va. 71, 149 S.E. 632 (1929).
103. City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 153 Va. 71, 149 S.E. 632 (1929).
104. Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S.E. 589 (1914); City of
Petersburg v. Petersburg Benevolent Mechanics Ass'n, 78 Va. 431 (1884).
105. 186 Va. 547, 42 S.E.2d 844 (1947). See also Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. County of Wise,
203 Va. 303, 124 S.E.2d 216 (1962).
106. See 1972 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 439.
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the effective date of this section shall continue to be exempt. .," This
provision has an ameliorative effect on the strict construction requirement
because the exemptions preserved by the "grandfather clause" have histor-
ically been liberally interpreted.""
The "grandfather clause" preserves the exemptions founded in section
183 of the former constitution;' 9 and although the opening language of that
section has been interpreted as calling for a rule of strict construction, '
the Virginia Supreme Court has, since 1914, liberally interpreted the ex-
emptions set out therein."' The court in finding a liberal interpretation
applicable looked at the history of the exemptions provided for in section
183 and determined that their language was intended to limit the power
of the General Assembly to further exempt property and was not intended
to limit the exemptions already set out in the section."2
The second ameliorative factor in article X, section 6 allows the General
Assembly to classify or designate as exempt "property used by its owner
for religious, charitable, patriotic, historical, benevolent, cultural, or pub-
lic park and playground purposes.""' 3 This section gives the legislature the
flexibility to explicitly exempt property which might otherwise fall outside
the bounds of one of the other exemptions when given a strict construction.
It must be noted, however, that any General Assembly action pursuant to
this provision must be strictly construed in line with article X, section
6(f)."4
107. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(f). The effective date of this section was the effective date of
the Virginia Constitution of 1971, July 1, 1971.
108. Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S.E. 589 (1914). The term
"liberal construction" implies that the meaning of a statute will be broadly interpreted and
that all doubts will be resolved in favor of the applicability of the provision. The term "strict
construction" requires that a statute be followed to the letter. BLACK'S LAW DIMoNARY 386
(4th ed. 1968).
109. VA. CONST. § 183 (1902).
110. Commonwealth v. Trustees Evergreen Burial Park, 176 Va. 9, 10 S.E.2d 495 (1940).
111. See Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S.E. 589 (1914). See also
Cudlipp v. City of Richmond, 211 Va. 712, 180 S.E.2d 525 (1971); Washington Cty. v. Sullins
College Corp., 211 Va. 591, 179 S.E.2d 630 (1971); City of Richmond v. Southside Day
Nursery Ass'n, 207 Va. 561, 151 S.E.2d 370 (1966); City of Richmond v. United Givers Fund,
Inc., 205 Va. 432, 137 S.E.2d 876 (1964); Board of Supv'rs v. Medical Group Foundation, 204
Va. 807, 134 S.E.2d 258 (1964); County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College,
203 Va. 613, 125 S.E.2d 812 (1962); City of Norfolk v. Board of Supv'rs, 168 Va. 606, 192 S.E.
588 (1937); Board of Supv'rs v. City of Norfolk, 153 Va. 768, 151 S.E. 143 (1930); Common-
wealth v. Smallwood Memorial Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S.E. 805 (1919); Horsley, Taxation,
1960-1961 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 47 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1312 (1961).
112. Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S.E. 589 (1914).
113. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)(6).
114. Commonwealth v. Progressive Community Club, 215 Va. 732, 213 S.E.2d 759 (1975);
1975 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN. 484, 505.
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Thus, the present state of property tax exemptions under article X,
section 6 is a synthesis of the old and the new. The old being those exemp-
tions which existed prior to the adoption of the new constitution and which
are preserved by article X, section 6(f) (the "grandfather clause") and
codified in section 58-12 of the Code"' and which have historically been
given a liberal interpretation."' The new being the explicit exemptions of
the new constitution and the code sections promulgated thereunder, both
of which must be given a strict construction." 7
Because of this synthesis the process of determining whether a piece of
property is exempt requires two steps. First an examination of section 58-
12 of the Code is necessary to see if the property was traditionally ex-
empted by the liberally-interpreted provisions of the former constitution.
If not, the explicit exemptions of the new constitution must be examined,
while being mindful that they will be strictly construed." 8
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
116. See cases cited note 111 supra.
117. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
118. The "grandfather clause" and its interaction with the other provisions of the new
constitution has and still does raise a number of questions. The most pressing of these is what
does the "grandfather clause" exempt: does it work only to continue the exemptions accorded
specific items of property under the former constitution or does it continue the exemption
accorded classes of property under the former constitution. By way of illustration, if property
was acquired after the effective date of the new constitution, could the "grandfather clause"
exemptions and their liberal interpretation be applied or must one rest his claim for the
exemption of the property on the new constitution. The Attorney General has given his
opinion that the "grandfather clause" works to continue the exemption of the classes of
property (not specific items of property) exempt under the former constitution. 1972 Op. VA.
ATr'y GEN. 438-40; 1971-1972 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-Taxation, 58 VA. L.
REv. 1338, 1344 (1972).
The second question is how do the "grandfather clause" exemptions as embodied in VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-12 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (1976 Cum. Supp.) and the exemptions set
out in the new constitution interact. Section 58-12(1)-(4) and article X, § 6(a)(1)-(4) are
essentially similar provisions. Therefore, do they have independent existence or does one
operate to expand or restrict the other?
It was held in Commonwealth v. City of Richmond, 116 Va. 69, 81 S.E. 69 (1914), that
section 183(a) of the former constitution, which exempted property of the Commonwealth and
its political subdivisions, was self-operative and, hence, did not require any legislation to
make it effective. If this is also true of the provisions in the new constitution, then these
provisions should form a basis for exemptions independent of § 58-12. The Attorney General
in discussing article X, § 6(a)(4), has said that it is self-operative and stands as a separate
exemption. Thus article X, § 6(a)(4) and section 58-12(4) stand as two separate exemptions.
1972 Op. VA. ATr'v GEN. 438-40. The question arose in response to these particular provisions
because one, the constitution, does not require educational institutions to be incorporated
while the other does.
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2. Traditional Exemptions
a. Property of the Commonwealth and Its Political Subdivisions
Property owned directly or indirectly by the Commonwealth or any of
its political subdivisions is exempt from taxation."9 The exemption in-
cludes not only property owned by the state, but also property held for the
benefit of the state. 2 ' The General Assembly has the power to create politi-
cal subdivisions within the state, and the property of these entities is also
exempt: i.e., housing authorities,' port authorities,'22 turnpike authori-
ties.12 The exemption provisions make no reference to the exemption of
federal property lying in Virginia, but it has been held to be exempt unless
Congress consents to its taxation.
21
b. Property of Churches or Religious Bodies
The objective of this exemption'25 is to relieve from the burden of taxa-
tion those properties actively being used for religious purposes or as the
residence of ministers and the lands adjacent and necessary to their opera-
tion. If the property is not essential to the convenient operation of the
church or is held for some reason other than religious worship, it is not
exempt.' 6 However, the intent of this restriction is not to remove the
119. "Property owned directly or indirectly by the Commonwealth, or any political subdi-
vision thereof, and obligations of the Commonwealth. . ." is exempt. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-
12(1) (Repl. Vol. 1974). VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)(1), contains similar language but also
exempts the obligations of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth.
120. Citizen's Foundation v. City of Richmond, 207 Va. 174, 148 S.E.2d 811 (1966). For
example, an automobile leased to the Commonwealth is taxable since it is held for the benefit
of the owner and not the state. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 384.
121. Mumpower v. Housing Authority, 176 Va. 426, 11 S.E.2d 732 (1940).
122. Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 121 S.E.2d 615 (1961).
123. City of Richmond v. Petersburg Tpk. Authority, 204 Va. 596, 132 S.E.2d 733 (1963).
124. Board of Supv'rs v. Stanley Bender & Associates, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va.
1961). See HOWARD, supra note 1, at 1075 n.13.
When determining the vulnerability of property to Virginia property taxation, cognizance
must be taken of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 574
(1968), which exempts the personal property of servicemen assigned in one state and
domiciled in another. 1973 Op. VA. Awr'y GEN. 406.
The question has also arisen whether property located in Virginia and owned by a foreign
country is exempt. It has been opined as taxable unless a treaty of the United States exempts
it. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 402-03.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2)(Repl. Vol. 1974). Article X, § 6(a)(2), provides essentially
the same exemption.
Pursuant to article X, § 6(a)(6), the General Assembly has enacted VA. CODE ANN. § 58-
12.24 (Cum. Supp. 1976) which provides for the exemption of any church property when
"used exclusively on a nonprofit basis for charitable, religious or educational purposes. .... "
Id.
126. Under VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12.24 (Cum. Supp. 1976), church-owned property can be
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exemption if the church is put to some other use not in conflict with the
objective of the exemption. This objective finds its definition in the terms
of the exemption and the interpretations of those terms.
The exemption requires that the property be occupied, "owned and held
by churches," and be "wholly and exclusively used" for religious worship
or for the minister's residence.'1 These terms have been defined to a large
extent by determinations as to what they do not cover. Property is not
occupied or held exclusively for religious services if it is lying vacant or
covered by trees which are eventually to be harvested for the benefit of the
church.2 A private property owner on whose land a church is built cannot
claim an exemption because the property is not church-owned.' 29 The At-
torney General has given numerous opinions on the exemption of church-
owned property, and in finding many kinds of property not within the
exemption, he has often relied on the requirement that the property be
occupied and used for religious worship.' 31
The exemption also requires that the property be used exclusively for
religious worship.' 3' However, the exclusive requirement has been one area
where the liberal interpretation accorded "grandfather clause" exemptions
has been most striking. The court has said that the word exclusively "has
never been considered an absolute term in construing property tax exemp-
tion provisions.' ' 32 This construction allows a church to host other activi-
ties incident to its primary activity of religious services without having to
be concerned with forfeiting the exemption. 33
used for certain other charitable activities and still be exempt. See note 125 supra.
127.VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (Repl. Vol. 1974). The meaning of the phrase "the minister's
residence," found in this section has been a point of some dispute. The phrase has been
interpreted to cover the residence of a Bishop Coadjuter who did not have his own church
(Cudlipp v. City of Richmond, 211 Va. 712, 180 S.E.2d 525 (1971)) and the church-owned
residence of assistant ministers. 1975 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 487; 1970-1971 Survey of
Developments in Virginia Law-Taxation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1618, 1632-35 (1971).
128. 1975 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN. 494-95, 504-06; 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 356-57, 391.
If the property is not presently being used for exempt purposes, but there are plans to
devote it to exempt purposes within a reasonable period of time in the future the property is
exempt. City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
See 54 A.L.R.3d 9 (1974) for a general discussion of land held prospectively for charitable
uses.
129. 1972 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 403.
130. The following property is taxable: motor vehicles used by churches to transport mem-
bers to and from church (1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 384); church-owned property used as a
residence by a member of the custodial staff (1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 359); a church-owned
gas station which did not show a profit (1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 358).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(2) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
132. City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 91, 116 S.E.2d 79, 82
(1960).
133. Church property is exempt even though incidentally used as nursery school, 1974 OP.
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The above comments refer to the exemption of religious property as it
stood under the former constitution. Article X, section 6(a)(6) of the new
constitution gives the General Assembly the power to designate and clas-
sify certain property as exempt. Pursuant to this power the General Assem-
bly has extended the exemption of church-owned property beyond the
church and the minister's residence to all church-owned property used for
"charitable, religious or educational purposes."''
c. Cemeteries and Private Burial Grounds
Cemeteries and private burial grounds and endowment funds for their
care are exempt if not operated for profit. 35 Cemeteries which are operated
for profit may not set up a fund or trust devoted to the general mainte-
nance and care of the cemetery and thereby escape the taxation of those
funds.' 36
d. Institutions of Learning
The test for determining whether an institution's property is exempted
by this classification' 31 is found in the requirement that the property be
owned'31 by an "institution of learning"'3 9 and be "primarily used for liter-
VA. ATr'y GEN. 358; or for art and music lessons, 1975 Op. VA. ATr'v GEN. 452.
134. See notes 125 & 126 supra. See also 1974 'OP.VA. AT'rV GEN. 398-99, which describes
the practical operation of this statute.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(3) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
Article X, § 6(a)(3) of the new constitution uses almost identical language, except it makes
no reference to endowment funds. This omission does not, however, reflect the intent of the
legislature to subject them to taxation. HowARD, supra note 1, at 1078.
136. Commonwealth v. Trustees of Evergreen Burial Park, 176 Va. 9, 10 S.E.2d 495 (1940).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Besides institutions of learning, this
section also exempts:
Property owned by public libraries, law libraries of local bar associations when the
same are used or available for use by a State court or courts or the judge or judges
thereof, medical libraries of local medical associations when the same are used or
available for use by State health officials, ...
The major difference between Code § 58-12(4) and its companion constitutional section,
article X, § 6(a)(4) as noted in note 118 supra, is that the new constitution does not require
that the institution be incorporated.
The General Assembly has expanded the general area of this exemption by enacting VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-12.25 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This section exempts the property of nonprofit
incorporated alumni associations and nonprofit incorporated charitable foundations when the
total income derived from their operation is used for library, scientific or educational pur-
poses.
138. So long as the property is owned by the institution claiming the exemption and meets
the other requisites for exemption, the exemption is not lost because the property was used
and maintained by another charitable organization. Saint Andrew's Ass'n v. City of Rich-
mond, 203 Va. 630, 125 S.E.2d 864 (1962).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(4)(Cum. Supp. 1976).
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ary, scientific or educational purposes or purposes incidental thereto.' '..
The Attorney General has opined that an educational institution "must be
something like a college, and have a faculty, a student body, and a pre-
scribed course of study."'' 1 The qualification of "primarily" has been inter-
preted as requiring that the "dominant purpose" of the institution be the
pursuit of exempt activities. 4 2 When making such a determination of pur-
pose, the court has examined, in detail, the objectives, activities, program
of instruction, facilities and staff of the institution.'43
Once an institution has qualified as an educational institution, the court
has been very liberal in interpreting the term "incidental thereto."'' The
court has determined that the recruitment of students,' the retention of
faculty 4' and the planned expansion of the school'47 are activities inciden-
tal to the primary purpose of an educational institution. The court has
indicated the liberality with which it will examine educational exemption
claims by indicating that it would follow a good faith determination by
an institution's officers as to whether or not a piece of property is incidental
to educational purposes.'
140. Id.
141. 1974 Op. VA. ATT'y GEN. 364; 1972 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 81; 1969 Op. VA. A7r'y GEN.
228.
142. County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 203 Va. 613, 616, 125
S.E.2d 812, 815 (1962). See 1971-1972 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-Taxation,
57 VA. L. REv. 1618, 1633-35 (1971).
143. City of Richmond v. Southside Day Nursery Ass'n, 207 Va. 561, 151 S.E.2d 370 (1966).
See Harris & Russell, Taxation, 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. REv.
1844, 1845-46 (1967). Contra, Commonwealth v. Progressive Community Club, 215 Va. 732,
213 S.E.2d 759 (1975). The court held that a day-care center was not an educational institu-
tion for sales tax exemption purposes. The court distinguished the case from Southside Day
Nursery, by pointing out the strict construction requirement of article X, § 6(f) and the sales
tax context.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(4)(Cum. Supp. 1976).
145. Washington County v. Sullins College Corp., 211 Va. 591, 179 S.E.2d 630 (1971)
(college-owned property used as a girls' summer camp to promote the recruitment of students
was held to be incidental to the primary purposes of the school even though revenue was
produced). See 1970-1971 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-Taxation, 57 VA. L. REv.
1618, 1633-35 (1971).
146. Washington County v. Sullins College Corp., 211 Va. 591, 179 S.E.2d 630 (1971);
County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 203 Va. 613, 125 S.E.2d 812
(1962)(property bought by the college for future expansion and for resale to faculty members
for housing construction in an attempt to tie the faculty to the school was a use incidental to
the primary purpose of the school). See 1972 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 392-93.
147. County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 203 Va. 613, 125 S.E.2d
812 (1962).
148. Id. The broad reading given the educational exemption is also shown in an Attorney
General opinion exempting school-owned motor vehicles. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 361.
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e. Religious Associations and Hospitals Conducted as Charities
This section' is designed to cover a number of charitable activities
which are not conducted for profit. The term "charitable" as used in this
provision has been defined by the court as "liberal in benefactions to the
poor, beneficient," "organized and conducted to perform some service of
public good or welfare.""' As noted previously, the term "exclusively" has
never been construed as an absolute with reference to exemptions.'' In
place of the phrase "exclusively for charity," the court has adopted a
primary purpose or primary objective test.15 This test calls for a review of
the institution's reason for being, and if its objective as found in its corpo-
rate charter propounds a principle consonant with the court's definition of
charitable and the institution is not operated for profit the exemption
obtains. 3 For example, if the objective of a hospital is to operate on a
nonprofit basis and to serve the needy, it does not lose its exemption under
this provision because a majority of its patients are paying patrons5 ' or
because it obtains operating funds from a nonexempt source, 55 provided
that all of the funds received go to the maintenance of the institution.
f. Benevolent or Charitable Associations
Pertinent to an analysis of this provision 56 are many of the principles
already enumerated: charitable,"7 exclusive 15 and occupied.'59 The major
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(5) (Cum. Supp. 1976). This section does not have a direct
equivalent in the new constitution. However, under article X, § 6(a)(6) the General Assembly
can exempt similar types of activities.
150. City of Richmond v. United Givers Fund, 205 Va. 432, 436, 137 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1964)
quoting 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 282 (1954).
151. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
152. City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
See Horsley, Taxation, 1960-1961 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 47 VA. L. REv. 1311, 1313
(1961). See also 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 454-55 and 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 365, which
applied the primary purpose test to a rescue mission and a religious retreat.
The primary objective of a property owner claiming an exemption under article X, § 6 is
also used to determine the susceptibility of the owner to taxes when the property is used as a
source of profit or revenue. See note 191 infra.
153. City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960).
154. Id. Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1971).
155. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. County of Wise, 203 Va. 303, 124 S.E.2d 216 (1962).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(6) (Repl. Vol. 1974). This section does not have a direct
equivalent in the new constitution. However, under article X, § 6(a)(6) the General Assembly
can exempt similar types of activities.
The section is restricted by VA. CODE ANN. § 58-13 (Repl. Vol. 1974) which prevents any
association or corporation which promises to pay money on account of death or sickness from
taking advantage of this provision or any of the other exemptions in § 58-12.
157. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 130 and 152 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
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interpretational problems center on the meaning of "benevolent or chari-
table association" and "used. . .for lodge purposes or meeting rooms."'' 0
Prior to City of Richmond v. United Givers Fund,'"' this exemption had
not been discussed by the court in detail, and there was dictum that this
exemption only applied to fraternal orders.' 2 However, the court in United
Givers Fund"13 applied a liberal interpretation to the exemption and con-
cluded that the exemption was for the benefit of an association whose
primary purpose was charity even though it extended its charitable serv-
ices indirectly.'64 The court also concluded that if the primary activity of
an association is charitable, the association does not forfeit its exemption
if its property is used for offices in support of its charitable activities or if
the property is used by other charitable groups.' 5
The Attorney General, in determining whether an organization's pri-
mary purpose is charitable, will examine its activities, charter and by-
laws.'66 The most notable groups excluded by the primary purpose test are
organizations whose primary purpose has been deemed social rather than
benevolent or charitable, such as social fraternities, recreation associations
and social clubs.' 7 It should be noted that an association whose primary
activity is charitable does not lose its exempt status by promoting some
social functions.' 68
9. Miscellaneous Exemptions
The remaining paragraphs of Code section 58-12 provide for the exemp-
tion of the property of a variety of specific organizations exempted under
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(6)(Repl. Vol. 1974).
161. 205 Va. 432, 137 S.E.2d 876 (1964).
162. Id.
163. The United Givers Fund (UGF) challenged the taxation of their building. The city
in arguing for the tax claimed that UGF did not directly engage in charitable activities and
argued that the property was not used exclusively for lodge purposes or meeting rooms. The
court gave the statute a liberal interpretation and said that charitable service could be
indirect (through other agencies) as well as direct and that once this primary purpose test
was met the other activities were incidental.
164. 205 Va. at 436, 137 S.E.2d at 879.
165. Id. The Attorney General relied on United Givers Fund in opining that the property
of a national association dedicated to the improvement of secondary education was exempt.
1975 Op. VA. ATr'v GEN. 483.
166. 1974 Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 361.
167. 1974 OP. VA. Arr'Y GEN. 359 (recreation associations or community clubs); 1972 Op.
VA. ATr'y GEN. 415 (fraternities); 1970 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 261 (social clubs).
The General Assembly has the power to exempt community and recreation association
property under VA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(a)(6) (1974 Op. VA. A7r'y GEN. 359) and has done so.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-12.16 to .58 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
168. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 361.
[Vol. 11:589
19771 PROPERTY TAXATION 611
the former constitution. ' Also provided for is the exemption of property
of nonprofit corporations organized for the establishment and maintenance
of a museum or library.' 70
3. New Exemptions 7'
a. Intangible Personal Property
The exemption of intangible personal property 72 is not new to the
Commonwealth, but it is new to its constitution. 7 The exemption of intan-
gible personal property had been described as "a practice already existing
by legislation without clear constitutional authority."' 74 Consequently, this
constitutional provision served merely a house cleaning function by giving
the practice constitutional mandate.
b. Property Used for Religious, Charitable, Patriotic, Historical, Be-
nevolent, Cultural, or Public Park and Playground Purposes
This subparagraph allows the General Assembly by a three-fourths vote
of each house to exempt property used by its owner for one of the purposes
stated above. 75 Although this exemption does not have a direct ancestor
in section 183 of the former constitution, the exemption is not entirely new.
Many of the types of activities which can be exempted pursuant to this
constitutional power were exempted by section 183 and still have life in
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(7), (8), (10), (12), (13), (15)-(17) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12 (Repl. Vol. 1974) includes all of the exemptions recognized by the
General Assembly as having a foundation in section 183 of the former constitution and in
effect on the effective day of the new constitution. However, some of these exemptions were
found to be constitutionally infirm by the Attorney General and, therefore, were not recog-
nized as legitimate in his opinions. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 366 (community clubs); 1972 Op.
VA. Arr'y GEN. 413 (property of the Boy Scouts); and several others. See also Horsley,
Taxation, 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 51 VA. L. Rv. 1444, 1464 (1965).
The General Assembly subsequently acted and the offending exemptions were removed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Most of these exemptions were not lost, however,
because the General Assembly pursuant to VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)(6) gave them a new
foundation. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12.20 to .34 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-12(7) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
171. This means either exemptions not contemplated in the former constitution or exemp-
tions carried over from the former constitution in a substantially different form.
172. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)(5). The General Assembly has acted pursuant to this provi-
sion to provide for the exemption of the intangible personal property or money of professions
regulated by law, farmers and nurserymen (VA. CODE ANN. § 58-413 (Repl. Vol. 1974));
railway companies (id. § 58-516.1); telegraph and telephone companies (id. § 58-578); pipe-
line transmission companies (id. § 58-593); water, heat, light and power companies (id. § 58-
603 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
173. HowARD, supra note 1, at 1080.
174. Id.
175. VA. CONsT. art. X § 6(a)(6).
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section 58-12 of the Code. As a result, many of the cases and opinions
interpreting the meaning of these terms can serve as a guide for defining
the limits of legislative action under this provision.'
This exemption is the key to obtaining an exemption for property which
falls outside the limits of the other exemptions. The General Assembly has
acted pursuant to this provision to exempt the property of fifty-five differ-
ent organizations or classes of property.
1 77
c. Real Property of the Elderly
This provision empowers the General Assembly to pass enabling legisla-
tion that gives to local governments the right to exempt or defer the real
property taxes of persons over sixty-five years of age and of limited
means."8 The provision has safeguards to prevent its use by persons capa-
ble of paying: the taxpayer claiming the exemption must own and occupy
the property; it must be his sole dwelling; and he must be bearing a
substantial tax burden. 7 ' The General Assembly in its enabling legisla-
tion '8 prescribed a detailed formula for determining whether the taxpayer
is bearing a substantial tax burden.' This exemption has not been the
subject of litigation, but the Attorney General has given a number of
opinions affecting its application. 18
d. Pollution Control Equipment and Household Goods and Personal
Effects
The remaining two exemptions in article X, section 6, allow the General
Assembly by general law either to exempt directly or to give to localities
the right to exempt pollution control equipment's and household goods
176. Although the case law and Attorney General Opinions can aid one in interpreting the
meaning of such terms as charitable or religious, it must be remembered that the terms of
this provision must be strictly interpreted in line with the requirement of VA. CONsT. art. X,
§ 6(0.
177. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-12.2 to .58 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Several of these exemptions
have already been discussed. See notes 125 and 137 supra and accompanying text.
178. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
179. Id.
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See 1970-1971 Survey of Developments
in Virginia Law-Taxation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1618, 1622, 1623 (1971).
181. 1976 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 347 (discussion of net worth criteria); 1976 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN.
397 (discussion of the applicability of net worth tests to relatives living within the household).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
182. 1975 OP. VA. AT'y GEN. 493 (house trailers which qualify as real estate fall within
this provision); 1975 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN. 468 (the provision cannot serve as rent relief enabling
legislation); 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 401 (discusses the definitions of income as prescribed
in the statute).
183. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(d). See 1971-1972 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-
Taxation, 58 VA. L. Rv. 1338, 1344 (1972).
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and personal effects.' 4 The General Assembly has acted pursuant to both
exemptions and has given localities the option of providing for these ex-
emptions.'1
4. Loss of Exemption
Article X, section 6, gives the General Assembly two tools with which
to lessen the impact of exemptions. The more restricted of the tools is a
constitutional provision allowing the General Assembly to authorize local
governments to impose a service charge on the owners of exempt property
being supplied services by the locality. ' The General Assembly has passed
enabling legislation pursuant to this section allowing the imposition of
service charges on all classes of exempt property except churches and the
residences of ministers "and property used or operated exclusively for pri-
vate educational or charitable purposes and not for profit other than fac-
ulty and staff housing of any such educational institution. '1 7
The second and much broader tool is the power of the General Assembly
to restrict or condition exemptions.' 8 The most significant restriction en-
acted pursuant to this power'8 9 provides for the taxation of otherwise ex-
empt property, not belonging to the Commonwealth, which is used as a
source of income or revenue.8 8
A concise statement of the test for determining whether a piece of prop-
erty is used as a source of income or profit is presented in County of
Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College:'9'
184. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(e). A provision allowing the exemption of household goods and
personal effects was in the former constitution (1902) but it was not listed with the other
exemptions. VA. CONST. § 169 (1902).
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-16.3 (Repl. Vol. 1974) gives to localities the option to exempt or
partially exempt pollution control equipment. Id. § 58-829.1 gives localities the option to
exempt all or some of the classes of personal effects and household goods listed therein.
186. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(g). See 1971-1972 Survey of Developments in Virginia Law-
Taxation, 58 VA. L. REV. 1338, 1343 (1972); 1970-1971 Survey of Developments in Virginia
Law-Taxation, 57 VA. L. Rav. 1618, 1623 (1971).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See 1973 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 444.
188. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 6(c).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-14 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
190. Id. This section allows for the partial exemption of a building if part of it is used for
revenue generating purposes and part for purposes exempt under id. § 58-12 (Cum. Supp.
1976). Id. § 58-16 (Repl. Vol. 1974) specifies the manner in which the building is to be assessed
if the building is used for both revenue producing purposes and exempt purposes.
191. 203 Va. 613, 617, 125 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1962). Questions concerning the applicability
of § 58-14 have arisen in response to all of the different classes of exemptions.
Commonwealth Property: "Only property not belonging to the state, which is otherwise
exempt, loses its exempt status when it is leased or becomes a source of revenue or profit
1977]
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[I]f the use ... of the property has direct reference to the purposes for
which the institution was created, and tends immediately and directly to
promote these purposes, it is then within the exemption provisions of the
Constitution although revenue or profit is derived therefrom as an incident
to its use.
The test is best discussed within a factual frame of reference. In
Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A.,'5 2 it was contended that the
Y.M.C.A.'s property should be taxed because the rental of rooms for a fee
made the property a source of revenue. The court said that if the primary
objective of the Y.M.C.A. in having the rooms and renting them was to
receive income or revenue, the property was taxable, and it would be
taxable even though the revenue went to finance the Y.M.C.A.'s charitable
projects.' 3 However, if the dominant purpose for the rooms was not to
.. " Citizens Foundation v. City of Richmond, 207 Va. 174, 181, 148 S.E.2d 811, 816
(1966).
Political Subdivisions of the Commonwealth:
[AIl property lawfully owned and held by cities and towns for governmental pur-
poses, though a source of revenue, . . . used for municipal purposes by the city, the
dominant purpose in the use having direct references to the purposes for which the
property is authorized by law to be owned and held, and tends immediately and
directly to promote those purposes, is exempt ....
Commonwealth v. City of Richmond, 116 Va. 69, 80-81, 81 S.E. 69, 73 (1914). In Board of
Supv'rs v. City of Norfolk, 153 Va. 768, 151 S.E. 143 (1930), the court determined that city
owned land surrounding the city's reservoir served primarily as a buffer zone against pollu-
tion and the revenue derived from the lease of the land to farmers was only incidental to the
main purpose of protecting the reservoir.
With reference to public utilities owned by one political subdivision and located in another,
see VA. CODE ANN. § 58-19 (Repl. Vol. 1974). This section provides for the manner in which
the property is to be taxed if it is determined that the revenue generated by the facility is
not incidental to its primary purpose but is in fact substantial. See also 1974 OP.VA. ATr'y
GEN. 399-400; 1972 OP. VA. Arr'y GEN. 422-24.
The taxation of government property used as a source of revenue is also discussed in City
of Norfolk v. Board of Supv'rs, 168 Va. 606, 192 S.E. 588 (1937); City of Newport News v.
Warwick County, 159 Va. 571, 166 S.E. 570 (1932); 1972 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 415.
Religious Exemptions: see the Attorney General Opinions cited in note 130 supra.
Educational Exemptions: Washington Cty. v. Sullins College, 211 Va. 591, 179 S.E.2d 630
(1971); County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 203 Va. 613, 125 S.E.2d
812 (1962); Commonwealth v. Smallwood Memorial Inst., 124 Va. 142, 97 S.E. 805 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Trustees of Hampton Inst., 106 Va. 614, 56 S.E. 594 (1907); 1972 OP. VA.
ATr'v GEN. 392.
Charitable Property: Board of Supv'rs v. Medical Group Foundation, Inc., 204 Va. 807, 134
S.E.2d 258 (1964); Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. County of Wise, 203 Va. 303, 124 S.E.2d 216(1962); City of Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 202 Va. 86, 116 S.E.2d 79 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y.M.C.A., 115 Va. 745, 80 S.R. 589 (1913); 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y
GEN. 363, 364, 390, 391.




provide a source of income but was a method of promoting the charitable
objectives of the organization, in this instance surrounding young men and
boys with "Christian influence,"' 9 the property was exempt even though
some revenue was produced.' 5
An alternative definition of this test is: if the property is principally used
for an exempt purpose, and the income is not substantial after deducting
from gross income all applicable expenses, the property is exempt.'96 How-
ever, if the property is not used for the purpose for which the exempt
organization was created but is used with a profit motive in mind, the
property is taxable.'97
The General Assembly in another effort to tax all property nbt used for
exempt purposes has provided for the taxation of a leaseholder's interest
in property otherwise exempt from taxation."' Usually when a piece of
property is leased it is a source of revenue or profit not incident to an
exempt purpose and thus taxable under section 58-12. But there are two
instances when property can be leased and remain tax exempt for its
owner. The first instance is the lease of Commonwealth property, which is
specifically excluded from the operation of section 58-14. Thus, state-
owned property leased for a fair consideration is not taxable to the Com-
monwealth, but the leasehold interest of the lessee not engaged in an
exempt activity is taxable."' The other situation arises when an organiza-
tion whose property is tax exempt leases its property, but the income
generated by the lease is so small as to be only incidental to the main
purpose of the organization. This allows the owner of the property to escape
taxation of the property and makes the holder of the lease liable to taxation
provided his activities are not otherwise exempt. 20
The General Assembly has enacted several other statutes applicable to
tax exemptions. One of these provides that tax exempt property becomes
194. Id. at 755, 80 S.E. at 592.
195. Id. at 752, 80 S.E. at 591.
196. 1974 Op. VA. AT'y GEN. 390-91. The Attorney General opined that a parking garage
owned and operated by a hospital which charged a fee for parking might be exempt if the
purpose of the garage was to further the purposes of the charitable hospital and no
"substantial profit" was derived. Id.
197. Commonwealth v. Trustees of Hampton Inst., 106 Va. 614, 56 S.E. 594 (1907).
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-758 (Repl. Vol. 1974); id. § 58-758.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
199. Shaia v. City of Richmond, 207 Va. 885, 153 S.E.2d 257 (1967). Shaia operated a
restaurant in space leased from the Commonwealth. The court held it was not an indirect
tax on the Commonwealth but a tax on Shaia's leasehold interest. See Industrial Dev. Auth.
v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d 326 (1967); 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 475; Harris & Russell,
Taxation, 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 1844, 1845 (1967).
200. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GErN. 370.
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taxable immediately upon its sale to any person not having tax exempt
status.2 0' The General Assembly has also provided that localities may re-
quire owners of tax exempt property to file on a yearly basis a request for
continued tax-exempt status, showing the use and ownership of the prop-
erty.2 02
III. FAIR MARKET VALUE REQUIREMENT
A. DEFINITION
Article X, section 2, of the Virginia Constitution' requires that all assess-
ments for tax purposes be made at fair market value.2 The fair market
value requirement applies to local as well as state taxation and to assess-
ments of both real estate and tangible personal property.3 The constitution
authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe how assessments are to be
determined.'
The fair market value requirement is the only rule provided by law for
the assessment of real estate and tangible personal property in Virginia.'
Determining the fair market value of property is, however, a perpetual
problem. The value of land, buildings and tangible personal property is
dependent upon many factors which cannot be prescribed by any general
rule,6 and although directed by the constitution to do so, the General
Assembly has failed to prescribe any guidelines or methods by which as-
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
202. Id. § 58-14.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The General Assembly has mandated that each
locality maintain an inventory and assessment of all tax exempt property. Id. § 58-14.1.
1. Formerly VA. CONST. § 169 (1902), this section is unchanged in the 1971 constitution.
2. The constitution allows one possible exception to the fair market value rule. The General
Assembly may define and classify land devoted to one of several uses-agriculture, horticul-
ture, forest or open space-provided such classification is in the public interest. The separate
classification allows such land to be subjected to lower taxes. See section IV C infra for further
discussion.
3. Real property is "construed to include lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and all
rights and appurtenances thereto and interests therein, other than a chattel interest." VA.
CODE ANN. § 1-13.12 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The value of a leasehold interest may also be taxed.
See discussion in section II D(4) supra.
Tangible personal property is classified but not defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 58-829 to 829.3
(Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976). See R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News,
217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976). For further discussion of the General Assembly's power
to classify see section II B supra.
4. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2.
5. Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669 (1926).
6. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Southern Ry.
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 278 (1970).
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sessments are to be made .7 Because determination of fair market value
involves so many factors, the Virginia court in reviewing appeals from
assessments tries to ascertain what the true value of the property in ques-
tion is on the open market,8 at the present time9 and taking into considera-
tion the property's present condition.'"
The factors in evaluating assessments which most significantly affect the
true value of each particular type of property are stressed. For example,
in assessing commercial property, the character of improvements to the
property and the income return of the property might be stressed, while
in assessing residential property, design, style and appearance would be
the most important factors affecting the property's fair market value" as
7. Nothing in VA. CODE ANN. § 58-864 (Repl. Vol. 1974), which directs local commissioners
of the revenue to assess the fair market value of all personal property and other subjects of
taxation within his district, on January 1 of each year, or any other code section, prescribes
the procedure to be followed by commissioners of the revenue in determining taxable values
or prohibits the use of multiple methods. And there is no constitutional requirement that such
methods be identical. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. at 206, 228 S.E.2d at
113. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S.E. 357 (1895).
8. Fair market value has most often been defined by the court in terms of the "willing
buyer" and "willing seller," as ". . . the price [property] will bring when it is offered for
sale by one who desires, but is not obliged, to sell it, and is bought by one who is under no
necessity of having it." Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 737, 101
S.E.2d 571, 574 (1958); Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Chamblin, 108 Va. 42, 46, 60 S.E. 727, 729
(1908). See 1976 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 440; 1970 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 249.
The court has also recognized that the fair market value of property is its actual value in
the market, the price it brings, and not merely its appraised value, the theoretical price, as
it was termed in Fruit Growers Express Co. v. City of Alexandria, 216 Va. 602, 609, 221 S.E.
2d 157, 162 (1976). This allows for the lowering of any assessment even if based on normally
reliable data when it is shown not to be in conformity with the actual value. Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 91
Va. 762 (1895).
9. See Fruit Growers Express v. City of Alexandria, 216 Va. 602, 221 S.E.2d 157 (1976);
Appalachian Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 187 S.E.2d 148 (1972).
10. See Fruit Growers Express Co. v. City of Alexandria, 216 Va. 602, 221 S.E.2d 157
(1976); Appalachian Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 187 S.E.2d 148 (1972); Skyline
Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson Cty., 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 437 (1947).
Fruit Growers Express is the latest and most detailed pronouncement by the court on the
definition of fair market value. The case involved the assessment of a tract of underdeveloped
land zoned for heavy industrial use. The land was situated near a main highway and had spur
lines connecting it with a main railroad track. The court, analogizing between assessment
requirements of article X, section 2 for taxation and condemnation purposes, rejected the
land owner's evidence of the value of the land. This valuation was based on first determining
the value of the land when the most valuable improvements had been made thereon, and then
working backwards to the true value of the land by subtracting the cost of the improvements
to be made and expected profit. The court said that this was not an acceptable method of
assessing value because
fair market value is not the theoretical price . . . that a particular purchaser might
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residential property. In assessing all tangible properties, and certain forms
of real property, the property in question must be assessed according to its
highest and best use." None of these factors or any other factor which
affects the fair market value of the property in question is conclusive
evidence of the property's fair market value; therefore, all such factors
must be considered.' 3
be willing to pay. Rather, fair market value 'is the present actual value of the land
with all its adaptations to general and special uses, and not its prospective, specula-
tive, or possible value, based on future expenditures and improvements, that is to be
considered.' Appalachian Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 708, 187 S.E.2d 148, 152
(1972).
216 Va. at 609, 221 S.E.2d at 162 (emphasis on original).
11. Certain factors will be useful in determining the fair market value of more than one
type of property. These factors would include location and comparable sales date of other like
real property within the taxing district, and depreciated reproduction cost for assessing build-
ings and tangible properties.
12. See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971), where
the court rejected the petitioner's argument that the assessment of its track properties and
its signal properties should be based on their salvage value. The court held that the highest
and best use of the various components - rails, ties, switches and signal equipment - was
to an operable railroad and not as scrap or salvage materials. Accord, Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 589, 100 S.E.2d 785 (1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
The "highest and best use" factor may be utilized in assessing real property not often
bought and sold, since no comparable sales figures would exist for such property. Appalachian
Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 187 S.E.2d 148 (1972) (trailer park); First and Mer-
chants Nat'l Bank v. County of Amherst, 204 Va. 584, 132 S.E.2d 721 (1963) (dam); Rich-
mond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 294, 124 S.E.2d 206 (1962)
(railroad yard).
13. In assessing commercial property, the court has used the following factors as indicia of
fair market value: (a) character of improvements, City of Norfolk v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
162 Va. 101, 173 S.E. 533 (1934); (b) income return or capitalization of income, Appalachian
Power Co. v. Anderson, 212 Va. 705, 187 S.E.2d 148 (1972); City of Richmond v. Chesterfield
Apt. Co., 206 Va. 22, 141 S.E.2d 703 (1965); Washington County Nat'l Bank v. Washington
County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515 (1940); (c) recent sales of like property in the taxing
district, City of Richmond v. Chesterfield Apt. Co., 206 Va. 22, 141 S.E.2d 703 (1965);
American Viscose Corp. v. City of Roanoke, 205 Va. 192, 135 S.E.2d 795 (1964); Washington
Cty. Nat'l Bank v. Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515 (1940); (d) depreciated
reproduction cost, City of Richmond v. Chesterfield Apt. Co., 206 Va. 22, 141 S.E.2d 703
(1965); American Viscose Corp. v. City of Roanoke, 205 Va. 192, 135 S.E.2d 795 (1964). But
see Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669 (1926).
In assessing residential property the following factors have been relied on by the court: (a)
relative values of adjacent lands, Griffin v. Norfolk, 170 Va. 370, 196 S.E. 698 (1938); (b)
appraised value of similar properties within the taxing district, and also size, cost, design,
style, appearance, availability of use and the economic situation prevailing in the area, Smith
v. City of Covington, 205 Va. 104, 135 S.E.2d 220 (1964).
In assessing tangible properties: (a) depreciated reproduction cost, Southern Ry. Co. v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); and (b) original cost less depreciation,
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971) have been utilized
by the court in evaluating assessed values.
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B. BREACH OF THE REQUIREMENT
Because of the large number of variables that must be considered, as-
sessing the value of property cannot be an exact science." The value of
property is a matter of opinion and the court has realized that equally
qualified persons use different methods and stress different factors when
assessing property. Until a single method of assessing property is devised,
assessments will remain matters of opinion and will necessarily vary.' 5
Variation in assessments makes absolute equality of taxation an impossi-
bility, and so the court has construed the fair market value requirement
of article X, section 2 in a manner that will avoid any conflict with the
article X, section 1 uniformity requirement. As a result, while all assess-
ments should ideally be made at fair market value, any system of assess-
ments that distributes the burden of taxation equally among the properties
to be taxed within a single classification will satisfy the requirements of
the constitution.'" If the enforcement of both the standard of fair market
value assessments and the standard of uniformity is either impractical or
impossible, the standard of uniformity will be preferred as the ultimate
end to be obtained.'" As a consequence, property has generally been under-
For a more detailed survey of assessment factors utilized by the court, including factors
which the author describes as appropriate in assessing special use properties, see Horsley,
Taxation, 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 1444, 1465-67 (1965).
Certain factors and methods of assessment have been specifically rejected by the court
because they do not follow the fair market value requirement. The value of property to the
present owner was rejected as an indication of fair market value in Tuckahoe Woman's Club
v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958). This case also rejected the practice
of assessing property based on the value of a particular use to which the property was put.
Accord, City of Waynesboro v. Keiser, 213 Va. 229, 191 S.E.2d 196 (1972); 1970 Op. VA. ATr'y
GEN. 249. Others rejected have been the straight line depreciation method, Lehigh Portland
Cement Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669 (1926), and the unit, or Connecti-
cut, method of assessing railroad properties, Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va.
692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971).
14. Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970).
15. "The estimates of witnesses as to the value of [the property in question] vary, as might
have been expected, for after all they are but estimates, and mathematical exactness is an
impossible standard." City of Roanoke v. Williams, 161 Va. 351, 354, 170 S.E. 726, 727 (1933).
Accord, City of Norfolk v. Holland, 163 Va. 342, 175 S.E. 737 (1934); City of Roanoke v.
Gibson, 161 Va. 342, 170 S.E. 723 (1933); City of Norfolk v. Snyder, 161 Va. 288, 170 S.E.
721 (1933).
16. [Article X, section 2] of the State Constitution provides that real estate shall be
assessed at its fair market value. But this provision is to be read in connection with [article
X, section 1], which declares that all taxes on property of the same class shall be uniform.
Any system of assessments which taxes all citizens ratably and alike meets the test of our
Constitution and of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. City of Roanoke v.
Gibson, 161 Va. 342, 347, 170 S.E. 723, 725 (1933). Accord, Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson
County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 434 (1947).
17. Skyline Swannanoa, Inc. v. Nelson County, 186 Va. 878, 44 S.E.2d 434 (1947); City of
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valued, and the tax rate advanced correspondingly so as to meet the reve-
nue needs of the localities.' 8 Usually, a fixed multiple or a certain percen-
tage of fair market value had been taken to reach the assessed value.'9
Undervaluing property did violate the fair market value requirement, and
would not have been permissible but for the fact that the court stressed
the importance of the article X, section 1 uniformity requirement."0 Use of
a fixed multiple or a percentage of fair market value had the effect of
making assessments determined by this method uniform. If every item in
a given classification was taxed at 50% or 70%, or even 30% of its fair
market value, the tax burden was spread uniformly over the entire class.
The fair market value standard was not completely abandoned, however.
Assessments, if not made at fair market value, had to at least have been
made in relation to the fair market value of the property being taxed. 2'
Norfolk v. Snyder, 161 Va. 288, 170 S.E. 721 (1933); Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Common-
wealth, 146 Va. 146, 135 S.E. 669 (1926). See Section IC and note 70 supra for further
discussion.
18. See City of Roanoke v. Gibson, 161 Va. 342, 170 S.E. 723 (1933), in which the court
said:
A municipality cannot function unless it can meet its necessary expenses, and that it
can do only through taxation. If in its [equal] distribution it be fair that a certain
lot should pay $100, it makes little difference to the owner if the lot be assessed at
$5,000 with a two per cent rate or at $10,000 with a one per cent rate.
Id. at 348, 170 S.E. at 725.
19. See Fray v. Culpeper County, 212 Va. 148, 183 S.E.2d 175 (1971). Accord, Washington
County Nat'l Bank v. Washington County, 176 Va. 216, 10 S.E.2d 515 (1940). "[The fair
market value] mandate has been so honored in the breach that no assessors feel called upon
to apply it in practice." Id. at 218, 10 S.E.2d at 516.
The 1869 Constitution read in part, "Taxation . . . shall be equal and uniform, and all
property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained
as prescribed by law." VA. CONsT. art. X, § 1 (1869) (emphasis added). Fair market value
assessments were the exception and not the rule in 1902 when the constitution was revised,
but the legislators felt that assessments based on fair market value were necessary to equally
distribute the burden of taxation. Therefore, the 1902 constitution (§ 169) dropped the provi-
sion requiring that assessments be proportional to the fair market value and substituted the
requirement that assessments be made at fair market value. This provision remained un-
changed in the 1971 constitution. See II A. HowARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITuriON OF
VIRGINIA 1047-52 (1974); Horsley, Taxation, 1964-1965 Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 51 VA.
L. REv. 1444 (1965).
20. See Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 734, 101 S.E.2d 571 (1958);
notes 16 and 17 supra.
21. See Fray v. Culpeper County, 212 Va. 148, 183 S.E.2d 175 (1971). In Fray petitioner's
land had been assessed at $9,260. County policy was to assess at 25% of fair market value,
and so according to the county's estimate the land in question had a fair market value of
$37,440. Evidence presented by the petitioner established the value of the land to be between
$16,500 and $17,500. Evidence presented by the county placed the value of the land in the
neighborhood of $25,000. The court, quoting Tuckahoe Woman's Club v. City of Richmond,
199 Va. 734, 738, 101 S.E.2d 571, 574 (1958), said that although uniformity is to be preferred
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Assessments for both real estate and tangible personal property had been
commonly set at approximately 40% of fair market value.
IV. REAL ESTATE
A. GENERAL
In 1975, the General Assembly, in a move to end the practice of assessing
real estate at less than fair market value, passed legislation requiring all
assessments beginning with those effective January 1, 1977, to be made at
100% of fair market value.' The action was taken to have real estate assess-
ment practices conform with the article X, section 2 fair market value rule.
All real estate need not, however, be assessed at 100% fair market value
on January 1, 1977. The General Assembly, by making this requirement
applicable only for assessments or reassessments effective after January 1,
1977,2 provided for the gradual implementation of the 100% fair market
value assessment of real estate through the normal machinery of assess-
ments and general reassessments. At present, cities are required to make
general reassessments every two years and counties every four years.3 Local
when both uniformity and fair market value cannot be obtained, "that does not mean that
property in any taxing jurisdiction may be assessed ... without relation to its fair market
value as required by the Constitution." 212 Va. at 149, 183 S.E.2d at 177. The court held that
even though the assessed value of $9,260 was less than any other estimate of fair market value
presented as evidence, when viewed in relation to the normal 25% assessment ratio, the
assessed value was greatly in excess of the property's fair market value, and, therefore,
incorrect.
22. See Letter from State Tax Commissioner to Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Nov. 9,
1962, 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., VA. 91, 20-301.20 (1966). The 40% figure represented the
average assessment ratio used. Historically assessment percentages had been lowest in rural
counties (13-20%) and highest in cities (75-80%). This fixed-percentage method is no longer
permissible as to real property. See Section IV infra.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2. Under the general reassessment system, the levy (the actual tax levied on real estate),
which is made as of January I of every year pursuant to id. § 58-796 (Repl. Vol. 1974), is based
on the assessed value of the real estate as determined by the last general reassessment. See
id. § 58-759. The assessed value remains the same for each tax year until the next general
reassessment. The requirement of 100% assessments applies only to assessments and reassess-
ments that become effective after January 1, 1977. Id. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3. Specifically, id. § 58-776 (Cum. Supp. 1976), requires that all cities having a population
of not more than 12,000 conduct a general reassessment in 1977 and every second year
thereafter. Cities with a population in excess of 12,000 are to reassess in 1978 and every second
year thereafter.
Id. § 58-778 prescribes a similar system for counties, as illustrated below:
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taxing districts may, however, reassess annually if they so choose.4 Accord-
ingly, if the locality is not required to reassess until after January 1, 1977,
this shift to 100% assessment of real estate need not take place.
While ordering conversion to 100% fair market value assessments, the
General Assembly sought to prevent the localities which had previously
Population Year of General Reassessment
not more than 14,000 1977 and every fourth year thereafter
more than 14,000 but not more than 24,000 1978 and every fourth year thereafter
more than 24,000 but not more than 39,000 1979 and every fourth year thereafter
more than 39,000 1980 and every fourth year thereafter
Population figures in each statute are determined from the 1970 census. Sections 58-776
and 58-778 apply only to real estate. Nothing in either statute precludes any city or county
from using a system of annual assessments in lieu of the general reassessment system. See
note 4 infra.
Sections 58-776 and -778 allow the implementation of 100% fair market value assessments
to be delayed even longer if a city or county generally reassesses (according to the old system
of rotation amended by § 58-776 and -778-see id. §§ 58-776, -778, -780 (Repl. Vol. 1974)
for the statutes prior to the arniehdments), the year before the year designated within §§ 58-
776 and -778. In this instance, such a city or county may wait until the next year designated
within the statutes to begin assessing at 100% fair market value. For example, if a county
with a population in excess of 39,000 reassesses in 1979 at the old percentage of fair market
value it need not generally reassess at 100% fair market value until 1954.
This delay has repercussions on the taxation of public service corporation real property.
See section IV B infra for further discussion.
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.27 (Repl. Vol. 1974) which provides for annual assessments
of real estate in lieu of the general reassessment method. Under an annual assessment system,
the Commissioner of the Revenue makes an administrative review of all the real estate within
the taxing district and may reappraise the value of any parcel of real estate whose value has
increased out of proportion to the increase in value of other real estate. These appraisals are
to be made as of January 1 of each year pursuant to id. § 58-796 unless the locality opts for a
taxation plan based on the fiscal year, in which case levies, assessments, any appraisals and
reappraisals will be made as of July 1 of, that year. See id. § 58-851.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
1974 OP. VA. AiTr'y GEN. 398.
Reappraisals can be based on certain acknowledged "tools" (methods such as "hotspot-
ting" and "continuous maintenance") of the appraisal trade, but such "tools" must be ap-
plied throughout the taxing district and not only in certain areas. The real estate may then
be reassessed on the basis of the reappraisal and taxed on the basis of the reassessed value.
Real estate not reappraised in any year is to be assessed on the basis of its last assessed value
as determined by its most current appraised value. With the passage of § 58-760, the language
in this section differentiating reappraisal from reassessment is now mere surplusage, since
the appraised value is its fair market value which is the value at which the property must be
assessed, when assessed under § 58-760.
The annual assessment system has been held to conform to the uniformity requirement of
article X, section 1. However, the court has invalidated particular methods utilized to make
annual assessments if the methods work to promote nonuniformity. Perkins v. County of
Albemarle, 214 Va. 240, 245, 198 S.E.2d 626, 629, aff'd on rehearing, 214 Va. 416, 200 S.E.
2d 566 (1973). See 1974 OP. VA. ATT'y GEN. 394; 1973-1974 Survey of Developments in
Virginia Law-Taxation, 60 VA. L. REV. 1607 (1974).
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assessed at less than 100% fair market value from receiving windfall reve-
nues when raising assessment values. It directed that localities, all of
which had previously applied a fixed multiple or percentage to fair market
value, lower the tax rate accordingly so that the aggregate of real estate
tax revenues generated after converting to 100% fair market value assess-
ments would equal the amount of tax generated before conversion.5
B. PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
Article X, section 2 requires a central state agency to assess the real
estate and tangible personal property of any public service corporation'
upon which the state levies a franchise, license or similar tax.7 The State
Corporation Commission (SCC) has been designated to make assessments
of public service corporation property.' Public service corporation prop-
erty, as all other property, was usually undervalued for tax purposes by
generally being assessed at 40% of fair market value.' Most localities,
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. The words "public service corporation" or "public service company" shall include gas,
pipeline, electric, light, heat, power, and water supply companies, sewer companies, tele-
phone companies, telegraph companies, and all persons authorized to transport passengers
or property as a common carrier, and shall exclude all municipal corporations, other political
subdivisions, and public institutions owned or controlled by the State. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-1
(Repl. Vol. 1974).
The real test for a public service corporation lies in the corporation's charter. Public service
corporations are chartered for public use and benefit and not solely for the benefit of the
individuals owning the corporations. The status of a company as a public service corporation
must be determined not by what it actually does, or intends to do, but by what its charter
prescribes it must do in the way of public duty. Norfolk Cty. Water Co. v. Wood, 116 Va.
142, 149, 81 S.E. 19, 21 (1914). Accord, Fallsburg Cty. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 S.E. 194
(1903).
7. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2. Determination of whether a tax falls within this provision is
difficult. See East Coast Freight Lines v. City of Richmond, 194 Va. 517, 74 S.E.2d 283 (1953),
where a road tax on gross receipts paid by a motor carrier did not fall within the meaning of
the section.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-503.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
9. The practice of undervaluing public service corporation property was upheld in City of
Richmond v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 50 S.E.2d 654 (1948). Richmond was one of the
few localities that taxed real estate and tangible personal property at percentages greater than
the 40% figure used by the SCC to assess public service corporation property, and, therefore,
stood to lose considerable income if all assessments had to be equal. The court held that in
light of the general custom of undervaluation, the 40% figure was acceptable, and that
property of a public service corporation was a reasonable and natural classification for tax
purposes and could be assessed at lower values than other property without violating uniform-
ity. Accord, Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 294, 124
S.E.2d 206 (1962); 1973 Op. VA. Avr'y GEN. 377.
The SCC, however, was not bound by the 40% figure. The Commission could have assessed
at any percentage or fixed multiple of fair market value, but adhered to the 40% figure
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however, assessed real estate at values less than 40% of fair market value.'"
By assessing real estate and tangible personal property at less than 40%
of fair market value, the localities shifted a disproportionate share of the
tax burden to public service corporations. In 1966, the General Assembly
passed legislation designed to equalize the assessment ratios (percentages
of fair market value) used by the SCC and the localities and thereby
redress the inequities to which public service corporations had been sub-
jected." Under this legislation, all real estate acquired by public service
corporations after January 1, 1966, was to be assessed at the local assess-
ment ratio used to assess non-public service corporation real estate. In
addition, beginning on January 1, 1967, one-twentieth of the assessed value
of the real estate of public service corporations, as of January 1, 1966, was
to be assessed at the local real estate ratio each year so that in twenty years
-by 1986-all public service corporation property would be assessed at the
local real estate ratio.'2 The General Assembly also passed legislation in
1966 to equalize tax rates. This was to be accomplished in the same man-
ner as assessment ratios were to be equalized.' 3
The 1975 legislation requiring that all real estate assessments be made
at 100% fair market value'4 had a great effect on the earlier changes the
General Assembly had made regarding the local taxation of public service
corporation property. So as not to disrupt the programs initiated in 1966,
the 1975 legislation, and further amendments in 1976, amended the 1966
legislation to conform to 100% fair market value assessments.' 5 To allow
probably because it most closely met the percentages used by the localities for assessing
property. See Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970). See also
Section III B & note 22 supra.
10. See Section III B & note 22 supra.
11. See Va. Acts of Assembly 1966 ch. 541. This statute is also known as the Bemiss Bill.
See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 692, 179 S.E.2d 623 (1971); Southern Ry.
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); 1975 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 442.
12. Specifically 1966 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 541, called for the appraised value of public
service corporation property as of January 1, 1966 to be frozen. All additions to public service
corporation property acquired after January 1, 1966 were to be assessed at the local assess-
ment ratio for real estate. Each year one-twentieth of the 1966 frozen valuation was to be
converted or equalized by assessing it at the local real estate assessment ratio. The
remainder-the unequalized portion-was to be assessed at 40% as it was before 1966. The
local real estate ratio was to be determined by the most recently published Department of
Taxation findings. It is helpful to remember that § 58-512.1 dealt only with assessment ratios.
See Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970); 1975 VA. OP. Arr'y
GEN. 442; 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 388; 1976 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 274.
13. 1966 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 539. This section mainly affected tangible personal
property of public service corporations. See section V B(4) infra.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
15. See 1Q75 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 620 and 1976 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 686 & 687
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the equalization program to continue, the amendments classified unequal-
ized public service corporation property as a separate classification for tax
purposes, to be assessed at the 40% assessment ratio previously in effect.'6
The tax rate on unequalized real property is to be the real property tax rate
in force in the locality the year before the locality begins assessing at 100%
fair market value." To prevent loss of revenue by the localities on the
unequalized property, the tax rate may be adjusted upward so that the
effective tax rate on unequalized property will equal the effective rate of
tax on non-public service corporation real property.'8
Because public service corporation property is assessed every year, the
value of equalized property will be certified to the localities by the SCC
at 100% of fair market value. Localities, however, are not required to
reassess property every year.'9 As a result, public service corporations will
again be bearing a disproportionate share of the tax levy if assessed at the
full current fair market value." To mitigate this problem, the General
Assembly has provided that the SCC must certify assessments of equalized
property at the true local assessment ratio' in any locality that assesses
at 100% of fair market value.1
2
for the text of these amendments. They are codified in VA. CODE ANN. § 58-512.1 (Cum. Supp.
1976).
16. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-512.1, -514.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The separate classification was
necessary to meet the article X, section 1 uniformity requirement. This classification has been
held to be constitutional by the Attorney General of Virginia. 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 442.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-514.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The rate is frozen until 1986.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-514.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See notes 50 & 52 of section V B(4) infra
for a discussion of nominal and effective tax rates.
19. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. Public service corporation property is to be
assessed as of January 1 of each year regardless of what date the localities assess. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-851.7 (Cum. Supp. 1976); 1976 Op. VA. ATT'y GEN. 357, 398.
20. This is because property values have a tendency to increase each year and unless
reassessed every year, the value taxed will be less than the full current fair market value.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-512.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). True local assessment ratios are deter-
mined by the Department of Taxation. Section 58-760 provides that every year before the
locality assesses at 100% fair market value, the SCC will assess and certify equalized public
service corporation property at the local assessment ratio. After the locality assesses at 100%
fair market value, the SCC will assess equalized property at 100% fair market value, and in
any subsequent year when the locality does not reassess, § 58-760 provides for the adjustment
of taxes on equalized property based on the difference between using 100% assessments and
the true local ratio (assessed value/real fair market value). This adjustment is to be applied
with interest to the following year's taxes. Interest rates are to be equal to the rate established
pursuant to § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. VA. CODE ANN. §'58-
760 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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As a result of the legislative changes in 1966, 1975 and 1976, all public
service corporation real property will be assessed at 100% fair market value
by 1986 and taxed at the local real estate rate.? Until 1986, all equalized
property, new property and any increase in value since 1966 will be as-
sessed, in essence, at the local assessment ratio and taxed at the local rate.
Unequalized real property is to be assessed at 40% of fair market value and
taxed at a rate no higher than the effective rate applicable to other real
property and no lower than the nominal rate in effect during the taxable
year immediately preceding the shift to 100% valuation. 2
C. SPECIAL LAND USE ASSESSMENTS
1. Background
The Virginia constitutional revisions of 1971 permit, for the first time,
use value assessment taxation of certain real estate. 25 More specifically,
this constitutional amendment allows the General Assembly to define and
classify real estate devoted to agricultural, horticultural, forest and open
space uses and to authorize relief"0 from the taxes that would otherwise be
payable on this real estate. Implementation of this constitutional amend-
ment was contingent upon three things.? First, the General Assembly had
to determine that it was in the public interest to classify real estate for such
purposes."' Second, if the General Assembly made this determination, it
had to prescribe the limits, conditions and extent of the tax relief.29 Finally,
no such relief could be granted in any locality except by adoption of a
concurring local ordinance."
The amendment as codified2 ' permits a locality to adopt an ordinance
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-514.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
24. For a discussion of the taxation of public service corporation tangible personal property
see section V B(4) infra.
25. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2. This provision for use value assessment and taxation is the only
constitutionally sanctioned exception to the mandate for fair market value assessment of real
estate. As to this need for a constitutional amendment under Virginia's ad valorem taxing
scheme see Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193, 204 (1972).
See generally II A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1054 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as HOWARD).
26. The constitutional provision would seem to imply that relief could come in the way of
a total deferral of taxes. As a practical matter, the General Assembly did not grant total
deferral, but left it up to the discretion of the localities, within the guidelines of the State
Land Evaluation Advisory Committee.
27. HOWARD, supra note 25, at 1055.
28. VA. CONST. art. X, §2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-769.4 to -769.16 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
For a critique of Virginia's preferential land assessment statutes and a comparison with other
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for the special assessment of real estate, when such real estate is devoted
to a qualifying use.32 For use-value assessment and taxation purposes, the
General Assembly has classified and defined four qualifying uses for real
estate-agricultural, horticultural, forest or open space use.
3
2. Adoption of the Local Ordinance
The adoption of a concurring use value assessment ordinance by a local-
ity is completely optional.3 4 However, there is one requirement that must
be satisfied if such an ordinance is desired: prior to the adoption of such
an ordinance, the locality must have enacted a land-use plan.3 5 The Land
Use Assessment Law, as amended, gives the locality the additional option
of adopting "any or all of the four classes of real estate . . ." for use
value assessment and taxation purposes.
Once a locality has adopted such an ordinance "property owners" 37 may
submit an application 38 for use value assessment taxation to the local
assessing officer. The application must be made by November 1 preceding
the tax year for which such taxation is sought. 9 Upon application and
state statutes, see Adamson, Preferential Land Assessment in Virginia, 10 U. RICH. L. REV.
111 (1975).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
33. Id. § 58-769.5 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
34. Id. § 58-769.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
35. Id. In addition, it would seem that a locality must have adopted a complete land-use
plan pursuant to id. § 15.1-446. See 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 383 (partial land-use plan is
not sufficient to fulfill this requirement); 1973 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 417 (zoning plan is not
sufficient to fulfill the requirement for a land-use plan). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.6:1
(Cum. Supp. 1976) (a city has the authority to provide for use value assessment in a newly-
annexed area while excluding all other areas).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.6 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
37. "Property owners" include an individual who is the owner of an undivided interest in
a parcel. Such an individual may apply on behalf of himself and the other owners, provided
he submits an affidavit attesting that such owners are minors or cannot be located. Id. § 58-
769.8. In addition, a person who has contracted to buy a parcel of land may submit a timely
application on his behalf for use value assessment and taxation, provided that he becomes
an owner by January 1 of the following year. See 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 527.
38. Application forms are to be supplied by the State Tax Commissioner. Applications are
to be submitted on these forms and the locality may require an application fee to accompany
all applications. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976). An application also must be
submitted whenever the use or acreage of previously approved land changes. Id. A locality
may require a property owner to verify annually by affidavit that no change in use has
occurred. Id.
A person owning several contiguous parcels of real estate may make one application for use-
value assessment if the parcels are jointly assessed on the land book. If not, a separate
application is required for each parcel. See 1975 Op. VA. Ar'y GEN. 456. See also 1976 Op.
VA. AT'Y GFN. 341 (definition of "parcel").
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976). In any year in which a general reassess-
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prior to the use value assessment of any real estate under the ordinance,
the local assessing officer must determine: 1) that the real estate quali-
fies by meeting the criteria set forth in the statute" and 2) that the mini-
mum acreage requirement is met.'
After preparing a list of all the applications filed and approved, the local
assessing officer must transmit the list to the clerk.2 The clerk is to file
the applications and index the names in a "Land Use Tax Assessment
Book." 3 In the event of a material misstatement of fact in the application
or a material change in fact prior to the date of assessment, the application
is void and the property will be assessed on the basis of its fair market
value."
3. Operation Under the Ordinance
In valuing real estate for use value assessment and taxation purposes,
the local commissioner of the revenue is to consider only those indicia of
value which the property has for agricultural, horticultural, forest or open
space use.15 In addition to his personal knowledge and judgment, the com-
missioner is to consider the recommendations on land values set forth by
the State Land Evaluation Advisory Committee (SLEAC).4 6 The
"recommended ranges of suggested values 4 7 for agricultural, horticul-
tural, and forest use are based on a soil capability classification and estab-
ment is being conducted, the property owner may submit an application within thirty days
after receiving a notice of increase in assessment. Id. These deadlines are not flexible. See
generally 1973 Op. VA. Ar'y GEN. 421; 1976 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 360.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.5 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
41. Id. § 58-769.7. Real estate utilized for agricultural, horticultural, or open space use
must consist, at a minimum, of five acres; forest use, at a minimum, of twenty acres.
42. Id. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976). For details of what to include in the list filed with
the clerk see 1974 Op. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 347.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
44. Id. Qualifying real estate is also required to be evaluated on the basis of fair market
value and land books must be maintained so as to show both use value and fair market value.
Id. § 58-769.9 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
45. Id. § 58-769.9 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
46. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976) created the committee. In addition
to the state agency officials mentioned in § 58-769.5, the committee consists of the State Tax
Commissioner, the Dean of the College of Agriculture of V.P.I. & S.U., and the Director of
the Division of State Planning and Community Affairs.
By virtue of the authority granted in § 58-769.5 SLEAC is to prescribe mandatory uni-
form standards of qualification for the various land uses. SLEAC also is to set use-values for
assessment, but these are only advisory in nature. However, as a practical matter all localities
have accepted these recommended values in applying use value assessment and taxation.
Adamson, Preferential Land Assessment in Virginia, 10 U. RICH. L. Ray. 111, 117 n.32 (1974).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.11 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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lishment of a rate of capitalization of net incomes derived through budget-
ing." For open space use, the suggested values are not based on production
capabilities, but on past sales figures adjusted by the consumer price
index.49
The land use assessment statute attempts to discourage changes to a
nonqualifying use by means of a "roll-back" tax." If a qualifying parcel of
real estate changes to a nonqualifying use, roll-back taxes are assessed in
an amount equal to the amount of tax deferred under the ordinance. "' The
roll-back tax is assessed for the year in which the change to a nonqualifying
use occurs and for the preceding five years.52 If the parcel was assessed at
the use-value rate for less than five years, the roll-back tax is assessed for
as many years as the parcel was assessed at use value.55 In either case, the
roll-back tax is the difference between the use value assessment and the
fair market value assessment. 4 Roll-back taxes are assessed with six per-
cent annual interest.
55
A person who fails to report a change in use is liable for the roll-back
taxes and such penalties and interest as provided for in the local ordi-
nance. 6 If a person had made a material misstatement of fact in applying
for the use value assessment, he becomes liable for the roll-back tax plus
penalties and interest under the ordinance and an additional penalty of
100% of the unpaid taxes.57
Separation of a part of the qualifying real estate, either by conveyance
or other action of the owner, for a nonqualifying use will subject the severed
parcel to the roll-back tax.5" However, such action will not impair the right
of the remaining parcel to continue to be assessed at its use value, provided
that the minimum acreage and other prerequisites are satisfied. 9
48. STATE LAND EVALUATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING RANGES OF
USE VALUES FOR AGRICULTURE, HORTICULTURE, FOREST AND OPEN SPACE LAND IN VIRGINIA WITH
SUGGESTED USE VALUES 2 (1976).
49. Id. at 33.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.10 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
51. Id. See 1976 Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 342.




56. Id. § 58-769.10:1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 58-769.13.
59. Id. Use-value assessment depends on the continuance of the real estate in the qualify-
ing use and not upon continuation of the title in the same owner. Id. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp.
1976). However, the taking of real estate assessed at use-value by right of eminent domain
does not subject the real estate so taken to the roll-back tax. Id. § 58-769.14 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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V. PERSONAL PROPERTY
A. INTRODUCTION
Personal property is everything, excluding real estate, that is subject to
ownership and can be exchanged for value.' For taxation purposes, Virginia
distinguishes between tangible and intangible personal property.' The for-
mer is segregated by the Virginia Constitution for local taxation only; 3 the
latter, not mentioned in the constitution, is subject to taxation by the
state.' Underlying the taxation of both tangible and intangible personal
property is the constitutional mandate of uniformity. Accordingly, the
mode of assessment and rate of taxation must be the same in any given
class within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.5
B. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. General
Tangible personal property is not defined in the Code. Rather, the Vir-
ginia legislature has chosen to specify various classifications of tangible
personal property.' The enumeration of taxable classes runs from the very
specific (automobiles)' to the very broad ("all other tangible personal
property not herein specifically enumerated . . .").1 Because of this desig-
1. Austin v. Housing Auth., 143 Conn. 338, 122 A.2d 399, 403 (1956).
2. What constitutes tangible or intangible property is usually determined by general prin-
ciples of property law. This determination, however, is subject to the power granted to the
legislature by article X, § 1 to define and classify taxable subjects. Lay conceptions of what
a tangible or intangible item is are, at times, decidedly unhelpful. For example, in the
landmark case of City of Roanoke v. James W. Michael's Bakery Corp., 180 Va. 132, 21 S.E.2d
788 (1942), the court held that delivery trucks, furniture and fixtures had been properly
assessed as intangible personal property pursuant to § § 68 and 73 of the Tax Code then in
effect (1928 Va. Acts of Assembly ch. 45, as amended id., ch. 232).
3. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-9 (Repl. Vol. 1974); id. § 58-829 (Repl. Vol.
1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976). See section II A supra for further discussion of the
power to segregate for taxable purposes.
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-10, -405 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
5. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1. See section H C supra for further discussion of uniformity.
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-829 to -829.3 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
7. Id. § 58-829 (5).
8. Id. § 58-829 (15) (Repl. Vol. 1974). The question of whether § 58-829 is a definitional or
a classific statute was litigated in R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228
S.E.2d 113 (1976). The court rejected a taxpayer's argument that § 58-829 defines tangible
personal property by listing examples, and that the mode of assessment applied to taxpayer's
property must thus be the same as that applied to other types of tangible personal property
as they are all within one class of property. The court emphasized the legislature's specific
use of the word "classification" in the Code section and the consistent construction of the
statute as a classification statute by the State Tax Commissioner and the Attorney General.
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nation of classes, the General Assembly is able to prescribe specific tax
treatments for a particular class without violating uniformity. Boats under
five tons, for example, are assessed and taxed as the locality desires.' Other
classes may be exempted in whole or in part from taxation.'0 Mobile
homes, another separate class for taxation, are to be assessed and taxed
as real property" if they meet the statutory definition.' 2 Prior to January
1, 1977, they were taxed as real or personal property according to their
characteristics. Single-wide mobile homes were taxed as personal property
at a rate not to exceed the local tangible personal property rate; double-
wide mobile homes were usually classified as real estate and taxed accord-
ingly.'3
Although the General Assembly may determine by statute what does or
does not constitute tangible personal property or what may be taxed as
such, local governments are left with the power to tax certain tangible
personal property at a different rate from other tangible personal prop-
erty.'4 The effect of granting such a power to the local authorities is to
enable them to give a "tax break" to the owners of the specified items by
imposing a tax rate lower than that imposed on other tangible property.'
5
Thus, automobiles (§ 58-829(5)) may be assessed and taxed differently from bicycles (§ 58-
829(6)) or other classes of tangible personal property. See also section II B & C supra.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-829.2 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
10. Id. § 58-829.1 provides that certain household goods and personal effects such as furni-
ture, appliances, musical instruments, jewelry and clothing may be exempted from taxation
by ordinance of the governing body.
11. Id. § 58-829.3 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Under id. § 58-760 which went into effect on January
1, 1977, all real estate is to be assessed at full fair market value unless otherwise exempted.
See section IV A supra for further discussion.
12. A "mobile home" is
an industrialized building unit constructed on a chassis for towing to the point of use
and designed to be used, without a permanent foundation for continuous year round
occupancy as a dwelling; or two or more such units separately towable, but designed
to be joined together at the point of use to form a single dwelling, and which is designed
for removal to, and installation or erection on other sites.
VA. CODE ANN. § 36.71(4) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
13. 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 494.
14. The governing body of any county, city or town may in its discretion classify certain
farm machinery and livestock, aircraft, antique cars or tangible personal property used in
research and development businesses separately from other tangible personal property. VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This power is not now, in all probability, limited
solely to these delineated classes of property. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va.
202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976), held that uniformity requires the same tax rate only within a
class, and, therefore, automobiles may be taxed at a different rate than the other classes
found in § 58-829. On this basis, § 58-851 appears to allow the variance of rates among any
of the classes found in §§ 58-829 to -829.3.
15. R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The local government is given no power, however, to exempt totally such
property from taxation.'"
Finally, it should be noted that some property is taxed as though tangi-
ble personal property, although conceptually or generally by statute it is
not tangible personal property. Merchants' capital, for example, is intangi-
ble personal property within the meaning of the tax laws.'7 However, it is
not taxed by the state as is intangible personal property, but rather it is
segregated for local taxation,'8 assessed by the local commissioner at fair
market value'" and taxed at local rates.2" Machinery and tools used in
certain businesses are not subject to the state intangible personal property
tax on capital but are reserved for local taxation at rates no higher than
those imposed on tangible personal property.2 ' Motor vehicles used in these
same businesses are also not subject to the state tax on capital and are
instead taxed as tangible personal property.2 The same is true for personal
property of businesses taxable on capital which is tangible in fact. Such
property is not held to be capital but is taxed as tangible personal prop-
erty. 23
2. Assessment
Article X, section 2 of the constitution specifically provides that tangible
personal property shall be assessed at fair market value. According to the
Code "each commissioner of the revenue shall ascertain and assess, at fair
market value, all the personal property not exempt from taxation . . . in
his county or city .. .. ,,2 Despite the constitutional mandate that tangi-
ble personal property be assessed at full value2 5 most of it is not.2 6 The
Virginia Supreme Court has honored the breach of this mandate and has
acknowledged that most local taxing authorities apply a fixed multiple or
percentage to fair market value in order to arrive at assessed value.Y The
16. 1973 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 410.
17. City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 186, 94 S.E. 989 (1916). Mer-
chants' capital is discussed in more detail in section V C(1)(b) infra.
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-9, -10, -833, -834 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
19. Id. § 58-864.
20. Id. § 58-832.
21. Id. § 58-412 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This is discussed in more detail in section V C(1)(b)
infra.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-412 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 58-864 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
25. For a discussion of the definition of fair market value see section III A supra.
26. See Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 214, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970). See
section III B supra for the historical development of this breach.




court's main concern, instead, has been the uniformity of the mode of
assessment and rate of taxation within the particular class. Still, if the
taxpayer can show that the assessed value is greater than the actual fair
market value, the assessment must be lowered, since it is no longer related
to fair market value.
2 9
3. Situs
It is the duty of every taxpayer to report property owned or leased by
him for taxation on January first of every year.20 The situs for the assess-
ment and taxation of tangible personal property, merchants' capital and
machinery and tools shall "in all cases be the county, district, town or city
in which such property may be physically located on the first day of the
tax year .. ."I' Thus, the locus of the property rather than the domicile
of the owner is determinative of situs.2 "Physically located" within the
context of the Code does not mean that property casually located in a given
taxing district may be taxed by that locality. In order to be taxed, the
property must be "used" in such a way as to be fairly regarded as part of
the property of the taxing authority.2
Because of their mobility, motor vehicles, boats and travel trailers, as
well as airplanes, are taxed where the vehicle is normally garaged, docked
or parked.34 The fact that the vehicle is not actually present on January 1
28. See sections II C, III B supra.
29. Fray v. County of Culpeper, 212 Va. 148, 183 S.E.2d 175 (1971).
30. According to VA. CODE ANN. § 58-835 (Repl. Vol. 1974), tangible personal property,
machinery and tools, and merchants' capital are to be reported for taxation as of January 1
of each year and the value of all such property is to be taken as of that date. Where the fiscal
tax year of a county, city or town begins on July 1 and ends on June 30, the governing body
may provide that all personal property and machinery and tools shall be assessed as of July
1 of each year. Public service corporation property in such localities would, however, continue
to be assessed as of January 1. Id. § 58-851.7 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
31. Id. § 58-834 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
32. This statement is true only with regard to property physically located within Virginia.
The common law doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam (movables follow the law of the
person) applies to property located outside of the Commonwealth but owned by a Virginia
domiciliary. Thus, a serviceman domiciled in Virginia but stationed in Missouri was deemed
amenable to a Henrico County personal property tax on his car even though the car was
located in Missouri on January 1. 1973 Op. VA. Awr'y GEN. 411.
33. Hogan v. County of Norfolk, 198 Va. 733, 96 S.E.2d 744 (1957). In this case, the tax-
payer, a resident of Portsmouth, Virginia, operated taxicabs in Norfolk County on January 1
of the year. Taxpayer argued that the cabs were only temporarily in the county and that they
did not belong there. The court held the taxpayer liable for the county tax levied because he
failed to show that the cabs were not kept and maintained in Norfolk County in the ordinary
course of his business.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-834 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Where something is normally parked or
docked appears to be a function of time. A boat physically present in Franklin County from
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is inconclusive. Floating property which does not achieve any attachment
to any waters or any political subdivision is taxed according to the common
law doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam - movables follow the person.
In such a case, the domicile of the owner of the vessel is the controlling
factor in determining the situs for taxation.3 6
4. Public Service Corporations
The tangible personal property of public service corporations is a sepa-
rate class of property3 and is segregated for local taxation. Prior to 1966,
the SCC assessed the tangible personal property of public service corpora-
tions at forty percent of its fair market value.3 9 A certified copy of the
assessment was sent to the local commissioner of the revenue who then
proceeded to impose the local levy.
With the enactment of section 58-512.1 in 1966,10 an attempt was made
to resolve some of the inequities which had existed in some localities be-
tween the taxation of public service corporation property and other prop-
erty of like nature which did not belong to public service corporations.'
The new section required that the assessed value of tangible personal prop-
erty be frozen as of January 1, 1966. Any increase in value over this amount
was to be assessed at the real estate ratio used by the taxing authority.2
One-twentieth of the fixed value was to be "equalized" every year by being
assessed at the current real estate ratio. The steadily decreasing remainder
of the fixed value ("unequalized" property) was to continue to be assessed
at forty percent. 3 The final goal to be achieved by this section was that in
March to November and in Roanoke County for the rest of the year was taxable by Franklin
County. 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 384. See also 1976 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 338, 366, 367.
35. 1975 Op. VA. AT'y GEN. 480. See 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 385-86 where a car operated
by a student during the full school year within a jurisdiction wherein the student resided while
attending school was held reportable for personal property taxes to that jurisdiction. It was
considered immaterial that the vehicle was physically present in another taxing jurisdiction
within or without the Commonwealth on January 1.
36. City of Newport News v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 635, 183 S.E. 514 (1936). Accord,
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 298 (1944). See also 1976 OP. VA. ATr'Y
GEN. 375.
37. City of Richmond v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 600, 50 S.E.2d 654 (1948).
38. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-518, -522, -578, -596, -602 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Note, however, that
the rolling stock of public service corporations is specifically segregated for taxation by the
state. Id. § 58-10.
39. Southern Ry. v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 210, 176 S.E.2d 578 (1970).
40. 1966 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 541.
41. 1973 OP. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 378.
42. See section IV B supra for a discussion of the effect of this section on public service
corporation real property.




twenty years-by 1986-all public service corporation tangible personal
propery would be assessed at the current real estate ratio.
Companion section 58-514.211 required that the rate of tax on public
service corporation tangible personal property be the same as that applied
to real estate in the locality. However, this requirement was not mandatory
for those localities which had been applying a higher tax rate to tangible
personal property than real property as of January 1, 1966. These localities
were allowed to continue to tax the assessed value of public service corpo-
ration tangible personal property as of January 1, 1966, at any rate desired,
but it could be no higher than the tangible personal property rate applied
as of January 1, 1966.11 This option was allowed as long as each year one-
twentieth of the remaining assessed valuation as of January 1, 1966 (the
unequalized property) would be taxed at the real estate rate.
Amendments to these two sections in 1975 and 19766 were necessary to
make these sections conform to the new requirement of 100% fair market
value assessments for real property." Section 58-512.1 remained virtually
unchanged, except that unequalized property is now designated as a sepa-
rate classification. This change was necessary to avoid uniformity prob-
lems, as new and equalized tangible personal property will now be assessed
at the same ratio as real property. This ratio will be, at some point after
January 1, 1977, 100%11 or reasonably close thereto in all localities.49 Sec-
tion 58-514.2 basically is also unchanged. The locality still has the option
as to whether to tax unequalized tangible personal property at the tangible
personal property rate applicable on January 1, 1966 or at the current real
estate rate. However, the real estate rate, if used, now becomes frozen at
the nominal rate" applicable in the year prior to the shift to 100% assess-
44. 1966 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 539. Note that all automobiles and trucks of public
service corporations were excluded from this provision. They were to be taxed at the same
rate applicable to other automobiles and trucks in the taxing locality.
45. 1973 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 420.
46. 1975 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 620; 1976 Va. Acts of Assembly, chs. 686, 687. For the
current status of these sections see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-512.1, -514.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-760 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See section IV A supra for a discussion of
the effects of this section on public and nonpublic service corporation real property.
48. Id. This section provides for an adjustment if public service corporation property is
assessed at a higher ratio than nonpublic service corporation realty. See also 1976 Op. VA.
ATr'y GEN. 375.
49. See id. § 58-512.1 which requires the SCC to certify property at the current assessment
ratio, which for years after a reassessment will be less than 100%, since actual fair market
values rise almost every year.
50. The nominal rate is the tax rate that is applied to the assessed value (the assessed value
being the assessed fair market value times the assessment ratio-i.e. 40%).
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ment of real estate.-" This rate must be changed, however, if the effective
rate 2 that results from the application of this nominal rate to the unequal-
ized property is less than the effective rate on real estate. The change must
be an upward adjustment of the nominal rate so as to equalize the effective
rates.53
C. INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
1. General
Intangible personal property is subject to taxation by the state54 unless
it has been specifically exempted therefrom in whole or in part.5 The Code
includes in its definition of intangible personal property: bonds, notes, and
other evidences of debt, 6 money,57 shares of stock,58 the capital of a trade
or business 9 and moneyed capital coming into competition with the busi-
51. 1966 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 539 simply taxed all real property, unequalized or not,
at the current real estate rate.
52. The effective rate is the tax rate that must be applied to the assessed fair market value
to give a tax liability that is equal to the assessed value times the nominal rate. For example:
property X has a fair market value of $100; the assessment ratio is 40% which gives an
assessed value of $40; and the nominal rate is 5% (five cents on the dollar of assessed value).
The tax liability would equal two dollars ($100 x 40% x 5%). The effective rate equals two
percent, since a rate of 2% with a fair market value of $100 would give a tax liability of $2.
53. The effective rate on unequalized tangible personal property will be less than the
effective rate on real estate for one or both of two reasons. Prior to the locality assessing at
100%, the tax rates will be equal, for the current rate will be the applicable rate. However,
the assessment ratios may differ causing the effective rates to differ. Once a locality begins
to assess at 100%, the tax rate on unequalized property is frozen and will differ from the
current rate and the assessment ratios will continue to differ.
54. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-10, -405 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
55. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a)(5). See section II D(3)(a) supra for further discussion.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-406 (Repl. Vol. 1974) provides that bonds (other than those of the
United States, Virginia and its political subdivisions), notes and other evidences of debt are
intangible personal property upon which an income tax is levied in place of a specific property
tax. This section does not apply to bonds, notes and evidences of debt which may be included
in capital under § 58-410, moneyed capital under § 58-420 or merchants' capital. The bonds
of counties, cities, towns and other political subdivisions of Virginia are also considered
intangible personal property but are likewise not subject to a specific property tax. VA. CODE
ANN. § 58-407 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
57. Id. § 58-408 (Repl. Vol. 1974) states that money, although classified as intangible
personal property, is not subject to a specific intangible personal property tax. The section
does not apply to money includible in taxable capital or in merchants' capital. Property
under this section is distinguished from that in § 58-406 in that the former taxes money held
on demand whereas the latter deals with securities. Commonwealth v. Stringfellow, 173 Va.
284, 289, 4 S.E.2d 357 (1939).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-409 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Although considered intangible personal
property, shares, too, are not subject to the intangible personal property tax as they are
otherwise taxed. This section does not apply to bank stock otherwise taxed. Bank stock is
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ness of national banks."0 However, since franchise taxes," licenses imposed
by state law and income taxes are held to be in lieu of the ad valorem tax
on much intangible personal property, 2 only moneyed capital coming into
competition with national banks and the capital of a trade or business not
otherwise taxed or exempted are subject to a specific intangible personal
property tax.6
a. Moneyed Capital
Capital which is "readily convertible into money" and has a "quotable
market value"" when coming into business competition with national
banks 5 is taxed as intangible personal property.6 Individuals not engaged
in a banking or investment business who make personal investments but
do not intend to compete with national banks are not taxed under this
section." Moneyed capital is computed insofar as possible according to the
rules governing the computation of bank stock" and taxed at the rate of
one dollar per $100 of value. 9 If a business is taxed for any year on moneyed
capital competing with business of national banks it is not subject to
income tax for that year.
otherwise taxed since stockholders are assessed and taxed on their shares of stock in the bank
(id. § 58-466 (Repl. Vol. 1974)) in accordance with VA. CODE ANN. § 58-471 (Cum. Supp.
1976); id. §§ 58-473, -475 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
59. Id. § 58-410 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
60. Id. § 58-420.
61. VA. CONST. art. X, § 5 provides that where a franchise tax is imposed upon a corpora-
tion doing business in the state, the shares of stock issued by such corporation shall not be
taxed further. A franchise tax is also the sole tax imposed on the intangible personal property
of certain public service corporations. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-516.1, -602 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-406, -407, -408, -409 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
63. One author has included bank shares and stock held by stockholders as property sub-
ject to the intangible personal property tax. Sager, Property Classification for Taxation, 43
VA. L. REv. 1325, 1326 (1957). However, § 58-473 specifies that the tax imposed by that section
on bank stock shall be in lieu of all other taxes and § 58-409 deems all stock to be intangible
property except stock of banks, banking associations and trust companies and insurance
companies which is otherwise taxed. Therefore, bank stock does not appear to be intangible
personal property.
64. First Nat'l Bank v. City of Richmond, 39 F. Supp. 309, 310 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1889).
65. National banks are those which operate under the laws of the United States as com-
pared to state banks which derive their authority from the state. BLACK's LAW DicTioNARY
1175 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Savings and loan associations, finance corporations and mutual
savings associations are not national banks.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-420 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
67. Id.
68. See id. § 58-471 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The value of capital, surplus and undivided profits
is added and from this sum the assessed value of real estate and the book value of tangible
personal property otherwise taxed in the state is deducted.
69. Id. § 58-420 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
70. Seaboard Finance Corp. v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 280, 38 S.E.2d 770 (1946); VA.
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b. Capital
'"Capital" within the context of intangible personal property taxation is
defined as the inventory of stock on hand (including all materials for use
in the business), the excess of all bills and accounts receivable over bills
and accounts payable7' and all other taxable personal property including
choses in action and demands and claims. 72 All capital of any trade or
business is taxed as intangible personal property at the rate of thirty cents
on every $100 of actual value73 unless otherwise taxed or exempt from
taxation.74
What constitutes a "business" or "trade" for capital tax purposes is not
elaborated on in the Code. "Business," as one court suggested, is undoubt-
edly a word of "broad meaning".75 Basically, the courts appear to accept
the decisions of administrative officials as to what is a business. The state
capital tax has been levied, for example, on corporations and partnerships
engaged in the "business" of operating apartment houses.7 1 State adminis-
trative officials were not, however, of the opinion that individuals operat-
ing apartment houses were conducting a business within the meaning of
the capital tax statute and the tax was correspondingly not levied.
7
The Code is as specific as to what the term "capital" excludes as it is to
that which it includes. Real estate, for example, is not capital .7 The mach-
inery and tools used in manufacturing as well as in certain other enumer-
ated businesses also are not taxable as capital but are made a separate
class for local taxation only.7 The local commissioner of the revenue is to
assess the machinery and tools at the fair market value" and tax them at
a rate not to exceed the rate imposed upon tangible personal property in
his city, town, county or district.8 ' Even though by statute such machinery
CODE ANN. § 58-420 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
71. Taxes owing by the taxpayer to the federal government are not bills or accounts pay-
able. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Commissioner of the Revenue, 137 Va. 714, 721, 120
S.E. 321, 322 (1923).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-411 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
73. Id. § 58-418.
74. Id. § 58-410.
75. Bott v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 745, 749, 48 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1948).
76. Colway Realty Corp. v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 1, 92 S.E.2d 271 (1956).
77. Bott v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 745, 48 S.E.2d 235 (1948).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-412 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
79. Id. § 58-412. This section specifies that machinery and tools used in manufacturing,
mining, processing or reprocessing, radio or television broadcasting, dairy, dry cleaning or
laundry businesses are not taxable as capital.
80. Id. § 58-864 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
81. Id. § 58-412 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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and tools may not be assessed as real estate, the law of fixtures may cause
machinery to be classified as real estate and thus assessed as real estate.82
No precise Virginia authority is available as to what constitutes a ma-
chine or tool." The former has been defined in other jurisdictions as a
combination of devices by means of which energy can be utilized to achieve
a certain result;84 the latter appears to be generally limited to instruments
of manual operation.' Whether a particular machine is "used" in a busi-
ness or trade as required by the statute is a question of apparent flexi-
bility.8 Machinery and tools not in actual use on January 1 of the tax
year' may still be taxable. Machinery and tools are not precluded from
taxation simply because the owner has ceased to operate a plant. Only
when the machinery has been dismantled and the facility has lost its
physical integrity may taxation be avoided."
As indicated above, machinery and tools are not subject to the capital
tax if they are used in certain enumerated businesses. Again, definitional
problems are encountered when attempting to discern what some of the
enumerated businesses encompass. The manufacturing business is speci-
fied as one business in which tools and machinery are not subject to a
capital tax. In Virginia, a manufacturing business is generally one in which
some transformation has occurred in the raw materials being used." The
Virginia Supreme Court has determined that three essential elements are
involved: raw materials, a process whereby the raw materials are changed
and a resulting product.
82. Carolina Cotton and Woolen Mills Co. v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 71, 121 S.E. 65
(1924); Buchanan Cty v. W.M. Ritter Lumber Co., 125 Va. 616, 100 S.E. 546 (1919).
83. Note, Taxation of Machinery and Tools Used in a Manufacturing or Mining Business:
An Analysis, 39 VA. L. REV. 249 (1953).
84. State v. Taylor, 262 Ala. 622, 80 So. 2d 618, 622 (1954), citing BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1101 (4th ed. 1951).
85. State v. Green, 245 Ore. 319, 422 P.2d 272 (1966).
86. See 1972 Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 84.
87. Machinery and tools are returned for taxation as of January 1 of each year. VA. CODE
ANN. § 58-835 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
88. 1973 Op. VA. A'rr'y GEN. 405.
89. City of Richmond v. Richmond Dairy Co., 156 Va. 63,75, 157 S.E. 728,732 (1931). Note
that under VA. CODE ANN. § 58-416 (Repl. Vol. 1974), the General Assembly specifically
designated dairies as manufacturers to the extent that they pasteurize and sell milk, produce
buttermilk and make butter, ice cream and cheese.
90. Prentice v. Richmond, 197 Va. 724, 90 S.E.2d 839 (1956). The court determined that a
poultry dealer whose operation consisted of buying, killing, cleaning, chilling and delivering
poultry to wholesalers was not a manufacturer for the purpose of the applicable tax ordinance
because there was no change or transformation of the live poultry into a product or article of
substantially different character. Bakeries (Caffee v. City of Portsmouth, 203 Va. 928, 128
S.E.2d 421 (1962)), a dental lab not operated by a dentist in connection with his own dental
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The supreme court has not decided what constitutes a processing or
reprocessing business for purposes of the capital tax exemption, although
it has dealt with the definition of processing for other purposes." The
Attorney General has issued an opinion that processing or reprocessing
involves a conversion of material or things into a different form than that
in which they originally existed.2
Other items not subject to the tax on capital include motor vehicles and
delivery equipment used in certain enumerated businesses. 3 These items
are taxed instead as tangible personal property. Personal property tangi-
ble in fact (other than stock inventory) used in a business taxable on
capital is also not subject to the capital tax but is taxed as tangible per-
sonal property. 5
The capital of merchants is, as was previously mentioned, a class unto
itself and is also not subject to the state tax on capital. 6 Rather, it is
subject to local taxation only,9" assessed at fair market value99 and taxed
at a rate of levy equal to or different from that imposed on real estate or
tangible personal property.9 While defining merchants' capital as the in-
ventory of stock on hand, the excess of bills and accounts receivable over
bills and accounts payable'00 and all other taxable personal property except
practice (1972 Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 403) and sausage makers (Commonwealth v. Meyer, 180
Va. 466, 23 S.E.2d 353 (1942)), have, however, been considered manufacturers for tax pur-
poses. For a complete overview as to what has been held to be manufacturing and who is a
manufacturer see Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 7 (1968).
91. Golden Skillet Corp. v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 276, 199 S.E.2d 511 (1973). In this
sales tax case, the preparation and frying of chicken for human consumption was held not to
be processing in an industrial sense.
92. 1975 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 482.
93. The enumeration is the same as that for machinery and tools. VA. CODE. ANN. § 58-
412 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
94. Id.
95. Id. This exclusion from capital tax applies to all businesses taxable on capital other
than the manufacturing, mining, radio, television broadcasting, dairy, dry cleaning or laun-
dry businesses. The absence of the words "processing" or "reprocessing" from the list is not
considered intentional and, therefore, they can be construed to be within this exemption. 1975
Op. VA. Arr'y GEN. 464. Such businesses would also include certain poultry and livestock
producers (VA. CODE ANN. § 58-412.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974)), suppliers of pulpwood, veneer logs
and railroad crossties (id. § 58-417) and certain poultry processors (id. § 58-412.2). Personal
property tangible in fact used in one of the foregoing businesses is includible in capital, with
the obvious exceptions of machinery and tools, motor vehicles and delivery equipment which
are specifically dealt with by § 58-412.
96. City of Richmond v. Drewry-Hughes Co., 122 Va. 178, 94 S.E. 989 (1918).
97. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58-9, -10, -832 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
98. Id. § 58-864.
99. Id. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
100. The amount of indebtedness may not be deducted from the value of the inventory.
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money and tangible personal property not offered for sale as merchan-
dise,'0' the Code neglects to clarify who exactly is a "merchant."'0 2 If the
local tax on merchants' capital is too burdensome, the taxing authority
may either lower the rate of levy"0 3 or adopt a license tax in lieu thereof.'"
Certain businesses are not subject to the state tax on capital because
they are otherwise taxed. These businesses include wholesale merchandise
brokers dealing in food products and other commodities, 5 cotton factors,0 ,
wholesale cotton buyers,' grain dealers,"' cotton and peanut dealers,0 0
small business investment companies organized under the Federal Small
Business Investment Act of 1958,110 banks and insurance companies."'
Finally, several state regulated professions"' are exempted from the cap-
ital tax."' Also exempted are industrial development corporations organ-
ized under the Code"' and farmers and growers. Public service corpora-
tions are not required to pay the state tax on capital."'
2. Situs
The situs for the taxation of intangible personal property is the domicile
1975 Op. VA. ATT'y GEN. 479. However, the local governing authority may, at its discretion,
exempt the excess of bills and accounts receivable over bills and accounts payable from
taxation as merchants' capital. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-833.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-833 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
102. The word "merchant" for purposes of the Virginia tax statutes has been defined by
the courts as a "dealer in goods, wares, and merchandise, who has the same on hand for sale
and present delivery." White v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 484, 485 (1884). The term has also
been defined as "one who is engaged in the business of buying commercial commodities and
selling them again for the sake of profit." Commonwealth v. Meyer, 180 Va. 466, 472-73, 23
S.E.2d 353, 356 (1942). Cooperative associations are taxable as merchants by the state but
remain subject to the local merchants' license tax. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-311 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-851 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
104. Id. § 58-266.1(5).
105. Id. § 58-292 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
106. Id. § 58-294.
107. Id. § 58-295.
108. Id. § 58-295.1.
109. Id. § 58-296.
110. Id. § 58-399.1.
111. Id. § 58-466.
112. Id. § 58-500. A complete list of businesses exempt from the capital tax is printed on
the back of Virginia form 761, "Return of Capital Not Otherwise Taxed."
113. Id. § 54-897.
114. Id. § 58-413. Professionals affected by this exemption include architects, engineers,
land surveyors, certified public accountants, dentists, optometrists, physicians, surgeons,
veterinarians and lawyers. 1 CCH STATE TAx REP., VA. 20-132B (1966).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-14 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1973).
116. Id. §§ 58-578, -593, -602 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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of the owner.' 7 Where the capital of a Virginia business has acquired a
"business situs" at an out-of-state branch of the business, such capital is
exempted from the Virginia capital tax."8 Conversely, the capital of a
foreign corporation which has acquired a business situs in the state is
subject to the Virginia tax on capital."' Intangible personal property is
returned for taxation as of January 1 of every year and the value of the
property is taken as of that date.' 0
VI. PROCEDURES TO REMEDY ERRONEOUS TAX
ASSESSMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Article X, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution provides that the Gen-
eral Assembly may define and classify taxable subjects. In doing so, certain
classes of property are expressly segregated either for state or local taxa-
tion. In addition, article X, section 2 provides for a "central State Agency"
to assess the taxable property of a public service corporation. Therefore,
in viewing appeal procedures for erroneous assessments and levies, it is
necessary to look at the procedures for the three types of assessments:
state, local and State Corporation Commission (SCC).'
B. STATE TAXES
The Virginia Code' has four provisions for the correction of erroneous
assessments or levies of state taxes. Two methods are administrative in
nature: an application to the State Tax Commissioner3 or filing an
117. 1 CCH STATE TAX REP., VA. 20-702 (1966). The situs for taxation of the intangible
personal property of a ward is the domicile of the ward. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 124 Va.
445, 451, 98 S.E. 5, 7 (1919).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-415 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
119. Id. § 58-414.
120. Id. § 58-423.
1. Generally, the provisions establishing these procedures are viewed as remedial in nature
and, consequently, the courts have given them a liberal interpretation. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Cross, 196 Va. 375, 83 S.E.2d 722 (1954); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel Co. v. City of
Newport News, 194 Va. 409, 73 S.E.2d 394 (1952).
"Assessment" as used in this section encompasses the valuation of taxable property (its
usual meaning), the application of the tax rate to this value or the billing of the taxpayer for
a specific amount of tax.
2. In addition to statutory provisions, the taxpayer should be aware of his right to bring a
common law action of assumpsit for taxes erroneously paid under compulsion. See City of
Charlottesville v. Marks' Shows, Inc., 179 Va. 321, 18 S.E.2d 890 (1942).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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amended tax return.' The other two methods are judicial: an application
to court by the taxpayer; 5 or an application to court by the assessing
officer.'
1. Administrative Remedies
Any taxpayer assessed with a tax "administered by the Department of
Taxation"' may appeal the assessment by applying to the State Tax Com-
missioner.8 The application for relief must be filed within ninety days of
the date of mailing the assessment to the taxpayer.9 After expiration of this
ninety-day period, the Commissioner is bound by statute"0 and can grant
relief only on an offer of compromise."
The taxpayer's application for relief should set forth the grounds upon
which he relies and all facts relevant to his contention. 2 The Commissioner
has the authority to request any additional information, testimony or doc-
umentary evidence that he feels is necessary.'3 Failure to comply with the
Commissioner's request for additional information could jeopardize any
subsequent appeal to a court."
The other administrative remedy is the filing of an amended tax return.'5
4. Id. § 58-1118.1.
5. Id. § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
6. Id. §§ 58-1153 to -1158 (Repl. Vol. 1974). These sections allow the officer, state or
local, charged by law to levy a tax or make an assessment, to apply within one year to any
court of record, if he believes that such tax or assessment was erroneous due to his mistake.
The court may find relief for the taxpayer or assess additional taxes. In certain cases, the
State Tax Commissioner is allowed a hearing. In any case, where the decision is adverse to
the taxing authority, an appeal may be had to the supreme court.
However, as one commentator has noted, these sections will be invoked only in highly
unusual circumstances and, therefore, merit little discussion. Davis, Procedural Aspects of
Relief from Taxes Administered by the Virginia Department of Taxation, 9 U. RICH. L. REV.
121, 122 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. But see 1975 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 497.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1974). This phrase is undefined by the Code. For
purposes of this discussion, it includes any tax on property segregated to the state for
taxation. See section H A supra. For an exhaustive list of taxes included in this category see
Davis, supra note 6, at 123 n.16.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 58-45.
11. Davis, supra note 6, at 125.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1118 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
13. Id.
14. See § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974). A judicial remedy for erroneous assessment is possible
provided "the erroneous assessment was not caused by the wilful failure or refusal of the
applicant upon request to furnish a list of his property or other relevant information. .. .
Id.
15. Id. § 58-1118.1.
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There is a three-year statute of limitations for the filing of such an
amended return. 6 If the State Tax Commissioner is satisfied that the
applicant was assessed erroneously, he may order that the assessment be
corrected. Correction of the assessment would include the right to assess
the taxpayer more if necessary, as well as to refund any over-payment.6
2. Judicial Remedies
The Virginia Code provides for a judicial remedy for erroneous assess-
ments.6 Under this statute the taxpayer may file an application in the
circuit court of the locality in which the assessing officer qualified and
posted bond,"0 or in the court to which his bond was returned.2' Addition-
ally, the taxpayer may file the application in any court of record of the
locality in which he resides. 2
Because the State Commissioner of Taxation and a Commonwealth's
attorney are not originally parties to the action23 the application is insti-
tuted on an ex parte basis and the initial pleadings should be so drafted.24
However, the taxpayer must serve a copy of the application on the State
Tax Commissioner at least twenty-one days before the hearing.2 Also,
the applicant may request interest on the refund, as it is now permitted
by law. 26 The applicant should not request costs, however, because the
taxing of costs against the Commonwealth is prohibited.? As some consola-
tion, however, no costs are taxed against the applicant provided the relief
sought is granted.2
Of utmost concern in the judicial application is the date the action is
commenced for the purposes of the two-year statute of limitations. The
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. §§ 58.1118.1, -1119.
19. Id. § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. See also id. § 58-435.
23. School Bd. v. Shockley, 160 Va. 405, 168 S.E. 419 (1933) [the court interpreting the
then applicable § 58-1145 (local assessment) found it equivalent to § 58-1130].
24. Davis, supra note 6, at 130.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1130 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Attorney General will usually answer
the application for the purposes of clarifying the issues in controversy. Davis, supra note 6,
at 130. Additionally, the Commonwealth can enter into binding agreements to waive the
technicalities of the statute. See Commonwealth v. Columbian Paper Co., 143 Va. 332, 130
S.E. 421 (1925).




Virginia Code provision which had provided for the tolling of the statute
between the filing of the application with the clerk and the hearing was
repealed in 1972.2 The repeal of this section has led one writer to observe:
"The implication of this repeal is that the case must actually be heard
within the two year statutory period, and that filing of the application no
longer tolls the statute of limitations. 3 0 Upon application for relief to the
court, the court is clothed with all the powers and duties of the assessing
authority.3' In this capacity, the court is authorized to correct the assess-
ment by increasing or decreasing it.3
2
In pleading and presenting evidence, the taxpayer should be aware of the
fact that assessments are presumed to be correct.3 The courts have gener-
ally viewed assessments as a question of fact fairly arrived at by the asses-
sor and they will not disturb them unless the applicant clearly carries the
burden of showing that the assessment is erroneous.Y The effect of this
presumption is that even if the assessor is unable to come forward with
evidence to prove the correctness of the assessment, this does not impeach
the validity of the assessment since the taxpayer has the burden of proving
the assessment erroneous."
If the court is satisfied that the applicant has been erroneously over-
assessed, it may order that the assessment be corrected.38 The court will
order that the taxpayer be exonerated from the payment of the excessive
amount.3 1 In most situations, the Department of Taxation will have al-
ready collected the contested amount.u If that is the situation, the order
entitles the applicant to a warrant on the state treasury for that amount.,
Note, however, that the taxpayer has only one year from the date of the
order to apply to the Comptroller for the excessive amount. After expira-
tion of the year he is barred from the recovery of his tax."0 The duty of the
court is to determine the correctness of the assessment., Consequently, the
court may determine that the applicant was under-assessed. In this situa-
tion the court has broad discretionary power and is clothed with all the
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1131, repealed by 1972 Va. Acts of Assembly, ch. 721.
30. Davis, supra note 6, at 126.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
32. Id.
33. See Union Tanning Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 610, 96 S.E.780 (1918).
34. See City of Waynesboro v. Keiser, 213 Va. 229, 191 S.E.2d 196 (1972).
35. See R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 217 Va. 202, 228 S.E.2d 113 (1976).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1134 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
37. Id.
38. Davis, supra note 6, at 132.
39. VA. CODE ANN.§ 58-1136 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
40. Id.
41. See id. § 58-1134.
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powers and duties of the assessing authority to see to the collection of the
additional assessment."
If the taxpayer loses, he may appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia
by requesting a supersedeas.43 If the taxpayer wins, the State Tax Commis-
sioner has the right to request a rehearing provided that he does so within
six months from the date that the order is certified to him by the clerk."
The State Tax Commissioner also has the right to request a supersedeas




A taxpayer attempting to correct an erroneous local assessment has
available several administrative channels. Initially the taxpayer should be
aware of the fact that the local board of equalization" is authorized to
correct assessments in order to accomplish the goal of equal taxation. 7 The
board can, either on its own motion or by taxpayer's petition, increase,
decrease or affirm an assessment. 8 An appeal to the proper court may be
taken either by the taxpayer or the locality. 9
Also, any taxpayer assessed with an erroneous assessment" by a local
commissioner of the revenue may make an application to the commissioner
of the revenue for a correction of the assessment.5 The application for relief
must be filed within the five-year statute of limitations period.2 By anal-
ogy, to the equivalent state tax section, the application should set forth
the taxpayer's grounds of contention and all facts relevant thereto. The
applicant may request interest on the refund, provided the locality has
42. Commonwealth v. Schmelz, 114 Va. 364, 76 S.E. 905 (1913).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1138 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
44. Id. § 58-1137.
45. Id. § 58-1138. A supersedeas may be granted in the case of appeal by either party as
in the manner prescribed for cases other than appeals of right.
46. Id. § 58-895 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
47. Id. §§ 58-904, -905.
48. Id. § 58-906.
49. Id. § 58-907. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
50. Erroneous assessments on the local level may include, inter alia, erroneous assessments
of real estate, tangible personal property, machinery and tools or merchant's capital. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-1141 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
51. Id.
52. Id. The beginning of the period is measured from December 31 of the year in which
the erroneous assessment was made.
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adopted an ordinance pursuant to statutory authority authorizing the pay-
ment of such interest.5 3
Upon application to the local commissioner of the revenue, if the com-
missioner is satisfied that he has made an erroneous assessment, he is
authorized to correct it." In most cases, the applicant has already paid the
assessment. In this situation, the commissioner of the revenue is to certify
the over-assessment to the governing body of the locality and they in turn
direct the local treasurer to refund the tax.5 Note, however, that no refund
may be given after two years has elapsed 8 from the date of the assess-
ment.- If a locality is aggrieved by the action of the commissioner of the
revenue under these proceedings, it may appeal to a court of record.5 8
Additionally, the governing body of the locality may provide by ordi-
nance for the refund of any local levies that have been erroneously as-
sessed. If the commissioner of the revenue is satisfied that the assessment
was erroneous, he is to certify the excessive amount to the local tax collect-
ing officer for a refund." There is a seven year statute of limitations on this
type of refund."
2. Judicial Remedies
Within the two-year statute of limitations period,62 a taxpayer may make
an application seeking correction of a local assessment to the court of
53. Id. § 58-1152.2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
54. Id. § 58-1142. Correction of the assessment includes assessing more if the taxpayer had
been underassessed, as well as exonerating or reimbursing the taxpayer if he had been over-
assessed. See also id. § 58-769.2 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
55. Id. § 58-1142 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
56. Id.
57. The period begins on December 31 of the year in which the erroneous assessment was
made. Id.
58. Id. § 58-1143 (Repl. Vol. 1974). The appeal must be filed within six months from the
date that the correction was certified by the commissioner to the local treasurer. Id.
59. Id. § 58-1152.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
60. Id.
61. 1976 Op. VA. AT'VY GEN. 393, 394. A problem may exist, however, due to this holding
that there is a seven-year statute of limitations period. The language of VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58-1152.1 explicitly states that "no refund shall be made in any case when more than two
years have elapsed since payment of the amount erroneously assessed." This conflict suggests
there is an unresolved question as to the applicable statute of limitations period.
It is agreed that the period is measured from the date of payment of the erroneous assess-
ment. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1152.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also 1972 Op. VA. AT'y GFN. 397.
62: VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This two-year period is measured from
the thirty-first of December of the year in which the erroneous assessment was made. Id.
There is no statute of limitations for the correction of double assessments. Id. § 58-1147 (Repl.
Vol. 1974). See also 1974 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 397.
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record of the locality wherein an erroneous assessment was made.13 In
addition, the commissioner of the revenue can apply to the court for the
correction of an assessment 4 when the assessment is based on such an
"obvious error" that "justice requires a correction."" This is a highly un-
usual situation and it is not likely to occur very often.66
The statute of limitations for an appeal of local assessments, unlike the
statute of limitations on state assessments," is tolled by the filing of the
application for relief in the clerk's office. 8 Additionally, for statute of
limitations purposes, the use of the words "assessment" and "assessed" in
this code section has presented some difficulty. The supreme court has
held that "assessment" as used in the first sentence can only apply to the
amount of tax (the money itself) the taxpayer is supposed to pay. 0 In the
second sentence, however, "assessment" applies to the value of the prop-
erty." Likewise, the word "assessed" as used in the first sentence means
the imposition of the tax itself, and in the second sentence it refers to the
determination of the value of the property." The court has concluded that
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Such an application to the proper court
may be made whether or not the applicant had previously applied to the commissioner of
the revenue pursuant to id. § 58-1141 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Id. § 58-1144. This remedy is not
available for correction of assessments for local improvements. Id. § 58-1145.1. However, this
judicial remedy is available to taxpayers aggrieved by the reassessment of subdivided or
rezoned lots pursuant to id. §§ 58-772.1-773. Id. § 58-772.
A remedy is available under id. § 58-841, -842, whereby if a group (six or more) of free-
holders requests a Commonwealth attorney to appeal an order for a levy made by the govern-
ing body of the locality, the Commonwealth attorney must do so within thirty days of the
order. See also id. § 58-774.1, 58-769.12.
64. Id. § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1976): This application may be on behalf of several tax-
payers. Id. This provision is very similar to §§ 58-1153 to -1157. See note 6 supra.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also 1975 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 507
(discussion of this procedure and "clerical error").
66. See generally 1974 OP. VA. ATr'y GEN. 300 (commissioner may represent the taxpayer
only if the assessment is obviously erroneous and unjust).
67. See note 30 supra.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1146 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
69. Id. § 58-1145 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
Any person assessed with county or city levies. . .aggrieved by any such assessment
may, . . . within two years from the thirty-first day of December of the year in which
any such assessment is made, apply for relief. . . . In such proceeding the burden of
proof shall be upon the taxpayer to show that the property in question is assessed at
more than its fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform . . . or that the
assessment is otherwise invalid or illegal . ..
70. Hoffman v. County of Augusta, 206 Va. 799, 146 S.E.2d 249 (1966).
71. Id. See also 1973 OP. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 83.




the second sentence does not limit the right conferred by the first. 3 This
conclusion, coupled with section 58-1151,'7 which construes section 58-1145
to include general reassessments, logically results in a taxpayer having two
years from the thirty-first of December to apply for correction of a general
reassessment (the determination of fair market value) made that year, and
also, two years from the thirty-first of December to apply for correction of
an annual assessment (tax) based on the general reassessment.7 5
Under this judicial application, the same presumption of validity of the
assessment and burden of proof on the taxpayer as in a state assessment
judicial application are present. 6 Also, the power of the court to reduce,
increase or affirm the assessment is the same," as well as the court's role
in ensuring the proper refund of an over-assessment or proper collection of
additional money in the case of an under-assessment."
While there is no specific Code provision for appeal to the supreme
court from local assessments, that court has held that where the taxpayer
prevails, the locality may appeal." It would therefore seem appropriate to
permit the taxpayer to appeal if the order was rendered against him. Such
an appeal would occur in the same manner as in a state assessment judicial
application. 0
D. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ASSESSMENTS
The SCC is the central state agency designated to assess the taxation
for real estate and tangible personal property of all public service corpora-
tions.8' Any company or corporation, the state or any town, city or county,
aggrieved by any SCC assessment of public service corporation property
may apply to the SCC for review of that assessment, provided that they
do so within three months of receipt of the certified copy of the assess-
ment."2 The application must set forth with reasonable certainty what is
73. Id.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1151 (Repl. Vol. 1974). See also id. § 58-795 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
75. See Hoffman v. County of Augusta, 206 Va. 799, 146 S.E.2d 249 (1966).
76. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text. See also American Viscose Corp. v. City
of Roanoke, 205 Va. 192, 135 S.E.2d 795 (1964).
77. See note 41-42 supra and accompanying text. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1148 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-1148 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
79. Commonwealth v. Schmelz, 116 Va. 62, 81 S.E. 45 (1914).
80. See note 45 supra.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-503.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
82. Id. § 58-672 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Section 58-674 allows the SCC on its own motion to
review and correct any assessment. This review must be accomplished within three months
from the date that the company or corporation received notice by certified copy of the
assessment and only after ten days notice to the affected company and taxing authority.
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being contested and the grounds of the complaint." The SCC upon receiv-
ing such an application is to set a date for a hearing."' Upon final determi-
nation, the SCC may reduce, increase or affirm the assessment.,
An appeal of right will lie to the Virginia Supreme Court by any party
in interest who feels aggrieved by the determination of the SCC.U If the
supreme court decides the assessment was excessive, it may reduce it with
interest and costs.9 7 If the taxpayer loses, he must pay the assessment and
interest thereon.8
VII. CONCLUSION
The objective of this note has been to provide the practitioner with a
convenient starting point for the resolution of a Virginia property tax issue.
However, it is incumbent upon the practitioner in his roles as citizen,
advisor, advocate and law maker to look beyond the solution of specific
issues and to look at the property tax with an eye toward the future.
Taxation has come to serve two important ends in our society: the rais-
ing of revenue and the effectuation of social policy. Article X of the Vir-
ginia Constitution reflects these two ends. The foundation upon which
Virginia's system of property taxation is built is the requirement that taxes
be universal and uniform. This foundation is not the broad level base that
one would suppose, however. Uniformity and universality have been tem-
pered by the concepts of definition, classification and exception. It is
within the latitude created by these concepts that the realities of social
concerns have been able to effect the tax structure.
The ever increasing demand for public services has placed greater reve-
nue requirements on all levels of government. Virginia's local governments,
which must rely on the property tax as the prime generator of revenue,
have felt the pressure. This pressure has lead to higher taxes and this in
turn appears to have lead to greater pressure for particularized tax treat-
ment. This particularized tax treatment has come through the exemption
of certain cla~ses of property and certain specific parcels of property,
through the classification of property by use and through the specialized
taxation of certain kinds of property.
83. Id. § 58-672.
84. Id. § 58-673. (Repl. Vol. 1974).
85. Id. § 58-675.
86. Id. § 58-679. Appeal must be taken in the time and manner prescribed for appeals
generally from the SCC. See id. §§ 8-462 to -464 (Repl. Vol. 1957); id. § 8-489 (Cum. Supp.
1976).
87. Id. § 58-680 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
88. Id.
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The effect of this specialization on the Virginia practitioner is greater
client pressure. The more latitude there is in the tax structure the greater
the pressure on the practitioner to expand or confine the scope of the
special tax treatment in the furtherance of one's client's interests. The way
in which practitioners meet this pressure will determine the future of prop-
erty taxes in Virginia.

